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This article represents the largest study of the labor market for first year associates at elite 
law firms ever conducted to date and fills a significant gap in legal education literature.  Other 
authors asked the question, “How does Law School P place its graduates relative to Law Schools 
X, Y, and Z?”   I seek to answer a different question: “What characteristics does Law School P 
possess that make it more successful at placing its graduates than Law Schools X, Y, and Z?”   
This is a far more useful endeavor.  Ordinal rankings have a short shelf life.  Even if a researcher 
managed to eliminate all potential sources of error, his or her rankings scheme would rapidly 
become dated, and prospective students and other stakeholders would no longer find them useful.  
After all, ordinal rankings are just that – ordinal rankings.  For example, while an ordinal ranking 
scheme might have Chicago ranked higher than Berkeley and Penn, and prospective law students 
might find this information useful in the short term, in the long run it is more interesting to know 
why Chicago ranks higher.  Does Chicago’s small class size give it an advantage, or is it ranked 
higher in spite of its small class?  Is Berkeley penalized because it awards honors/pass/fail grades 
rather than letter grades, or would it place even worse if it had a traditional system?  If Penn
changed its policies and began to release class rank information to employers, would its 
placement become stronger?  One cannot attempt to answer any of these questions with ordinal 
rankings alone.
Every year, more than 50,000 individuals make one of the biggest investment decisions 
of their lives – deciding which law school to attend, if any at all.1  When making this decision, 
some individuals consider subjective factors, such as a school’s location, existence of strong 
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 The Law School Admissions Council reports that about 55,900 applicants were admitted to ABA-accredited law 
schools in 2004.  Of those, about 45,400 chose to matriculate at a law school.  See The Law School Admissions 
Council, LSAC Volume Summary (2004), available at http://www.lsacnet.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/data/lsac-volume-
summary.htm.
2clinical programs, or diversity.  However, many applicants place an even higher value on more 
objective factors, such as cost of attendance and career placement.  A legal education is not 
cheap: law student debt of $80,000 or more is typical, often in addition to undergraduate debt.2
Naturally, one would expect prospective law students to weigh the monetary costs of attendance 
– tuition, fees, opportunity cost – against the benefits of expected future earnings and increased 
job prestige.  Unfortunately, many students cannot objectively weigh the costs and benefits of 
attending specific law schools.  While students can find out about costs with relative ease,3
shockingly little career placement information has been gathered and standardized.
Why have law schools provided so little career placement information when students 
place such a high premium on it?  Some theorists speculate that anti-competitive forces, such as 
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Association of Law Schools (AALS), 
have tried to standardize legal education and intentionally minimize or downplay the differences 
between institutions.4  Others argue that law schools would genuinely like to provide this 
information, but career survey response rates are so low that it is irresponsible to release
anything other than median private and public sector salaries.5  In any case, an information 
vacuum exists, and prospective students have been forced to turn to unofficial sources, such as 
commercial rankings.  Law school deans have almost universally condemned such rankings.  In a 
recent letter sent to all law school applicants, many deans describe commercial rankings as 
“inherently flawed” and encourage applicants to “minimize the influence of rankings on [their] 
own judgment.”  The deans conclude by encouraging applicants to gather their own information 
about law schools.6
I agree that commercial rankings such as U.S. News are a poor proxy for employment 
placement information.7  Every employment-related measure U.S. News provides suffers from 
significant validity problems.8  Median private sector salary is a poor measure of earning power, 
2 See The Law School Admissions Council, Financial Aid for Law School (2004), available at 
http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=/lsac/financial-aid-repayment.asp.
3
 Virtually all law schools will provide financial aid packages to their admitted students before requiring them to
commit to matriculating.  Thus, students can easily compare law schools based on cost.
4
 Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely.  What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 1483, 1507-08 (2004).
5
 Interview with Diane Downs, Associate Dean of Career Planning and Placement, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School (February 2005).
6 See The Law School Admissions Council, Deans Speak Out (2004), at 
http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/deans-speak-out-rankings.asp.
7
 To be fair, U.S. News has avoided a direct claim that its ordinal rankings serve as a proxy for employment 
prospects – the editors instead state that its rankings serve to give prospective students “an independent assessment 
of the academic quality of programs.” However, the editors of U.S. News do go on to state that individuals should 
use U.S. News data to compare institutions on several key characteristics, including “how diplomas from various 
schools will affect [applicants’] earning power” and “how successful the schools are at preparing graduates for the 
bar exam.” See U.S. News, Why does U.S. News rank graduate schools? (2005), available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/about/faq_meth.php; U.S. News, How to use our lists wisely
(2005), available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/about/05rank.b.php.
8
 For a thorough explanation of the problems with the U.S. News methodology, see generally Stephen P. Klein and 
Laura Hamilton, The Validity of The U.S. News and World Report Ranking of ABA Law Schools (1998), at
http://www.aals.org/validity.html.
3for it does not take into account regional variation in associate compensation9 or differing levels 
of job prestige,10 and low survey response rates make the medians for some schools highly 
questionable.11  Since many elite private sector employers make hiring decisions prior to the 
third year of law school, bar passage rates likely tell more about a student’s ability to keep a job 
offer than a law school’s ability to get a student a job offer.12 Even the percentage of students 
employed at graduation is open to manipulation and tells little about actual career placement.13
Several individuals have responded to U.S. News’s deficiencies by creating their own 
non-commercial employment rankings geared towards prospective students.  Such rankings vary 
significantly in quality.14  Perhaps the most well known rankings scheme was devised by 
University of Texas law professor Brian Leiter.15 The main difference between Leiter’s study 
9
 Standard market salaries for first year law firm associates vary considerably from region to region, often due to 
cost of living differences.  By looking at median salary alone, schools like Virginia and Emory, which send many 
graduates to secondary and tertiary markets, appear to place worse relative to schools like Fordham and Cardozo, 
which send more graduates to high paying areas.
10 A $125,000 median says little about a school’s private sector placement, other than that they are placing a 
substantial number of graduates in large law firms in major legal markets.  While twenty schools report $125,000 
private sector medians, the very top schools within this group may send their graduates to far more desirable firms.  
Law firm prestige is not a meaningless distinction: while most New York City firms might pay $125,000 starting 
salary, compensation levels can vary greatly for partners and even senior associates.  For example, Hughes Hubbard 
& Reed and Cravath Swaine & Moore are both New York City headquartered firms that pay first year associates 
$125,000; while the average Cravath equity partner earns $2,110,000 per year, the average Hughes equity partner 
earns only $450,000 per year. See generally The NALP Directory (2005), at http://www.nalpdirectory.com
(providing first year associate starting salaries); The American Lawyer, Profits Per Partner (2002), available at 
http://www.law.com/special/professionals/amlaw/amlaw200/amlaw200_ppp.html (ranking law firms by profits per 
equity partner).
11
 More than half the schools boasting $125,000 medians have response rates of 85% and below – Stanford (67%), 
Michigan (77%), Cornell (75%), Northwestern (83%), Berkeley (72%), UCLA (82%), USC (70%), GWU (77%), 
Boston University (73%), Fordham (85%), and Cardozo (66%).  Adverse selection problems are often present in 
salary surveys: non-respondents typically have significantly lower salaries than respondents.  Non-respondents 
might not respond because they feel embarrassed about their lower salaries, or they might not place a high value on 
salary and therefore do not feel the need to fill out the survey.  Non-respondents might also realize that reporting 
their low salaries could make their school look bad, and thus choose not to disclose.  Because of adverse selection, it 
is likely that those schools with sub-85% response rates may have private sector medians that are lower than 
$125,000, thus calling into question the precision of the median private sector salary data reported to U.S. News.  
12
 Law schools have been known to manipulate even bar exam passage data.  See Klein and Hamilton, supra note 8.
13 U.S. News does not verify employment data or distinguish between legal and non-legal jobs, and some schools 
have, in the past, hired their unemployed graduates as research assistants to boost this figure. See Brian Leiter, The 
U.S. News Law School Rankings: A Guide for the Perplexed (2003), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/guide.html.
14
 Two recent rankings lists employing poor methodology are the National Law Journal’s “most mentioned” and 
“most hired” lists.  In addition to not adjusting for regional or sectoral preferences, NLJ’s lists did not even adjust 
for differing class sizes.  See Angela Cheng, Georgetown, Virginia Among Most Mentioned, THE NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL (2004), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/documents/nlj_000.pdf.
15
 Brian Leiter, The Most National Law School Based on Job Placement in Elite Law Firms (2003), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/03_most_national.html.  I note that two other researchers have 
attempted similar studies.  John Wehrli’s population study preceded Leiter’s by seven years, and Michael Sullivan’s 
study was conducted two years after Leiter’s study.  Because the methodologies employed by the three researchers 
are remarkably similar, most of the faults with Leiter’s study also apply to the Wehrli and Sullivan studies.  See 
generally John Wehrli, Top 30 Law Schools at the Top 100 Law Firms, Adjusted for School Size (1996), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/19980520150138/http://wehrli.ilrg.com/amlawnormt30.html; Michael Sullivan, Law 
School Job Placement (2005), available at http://www.calvin.edu/admin/csr/students/sullivan/law/index.htm.
4and others is that Leiter made a good faith attempt to account for regional differences, firm 
quality, and class size.16 Unfortunately, Leiter’s study suffers from significant sources of error 
that make his ordinal rankings a poor tool for prospective law students.  Leiter fails to distinguish 
between recent hires and individuals hired a long time ago, fails to adjust for differing student 
sectoral preferences and for differing student regional preferences, does not properly adjust for 
LLM graduates, draws his data from an incomplete and inconsistent information source, made 
questionable choices regarding which employers to include,17 uses an arbitrary methodology 
biased towards large schools,18 and started his study with a pre-conceived notion of which law 
schools are “national.”19  Although every study will inevitably suffer from some error, Leiter’s 
highly significant errors all could have all been avoided by using proper research methods. 20
Of course, this begs the question: if existing commercial and non-commercial rankings 
are heavily flawed, and law schools disclose little or no meaningful career placement 
information, how can law school deans expect prospective students to gather their own 
information about schools in order to make informed decisions?  The answer is simple: they 
cannot. Without access to standardized employment placement data, law school applicants are 
forced to either make decisions based on subjective criteria such as “fit,” or use unreliable 
ordinal rankings such as U.S. News.   This is an unacceptable state of affairs.  I seek to remedy 
the situation in two ways: developing the first set of standardized regional and national 
employment placement rankings that take sectoral and regional preferences into account, and 
identifying several key variables that are strong predictors of national employment placement.
I. Research Design
How, then, does one go about studying employment placement?  The American legal 
market has become so large that no one paper can examine every sector.21  Although the elite law 
16
 While Wehrli adjusted for class size and quality, he did not take regional differences into account.
17
 Exclusively using the 2003 edition of Vault’s guide to determine which employers are elite may be misleading.  
Even if one assumes that regional Vault rank perfectly correlates with regional firm prestige, one must remember 
that Leiter’s study includes individuals who were hired over a period lasting several decades.  While these 45 
employers might be the most elite in their region in 2003, they might not have been the most elite in their region in 
1983, or 1963.  
18 Leiter himself states that “without a doubt, two of the measures used in calculating the overall rank are sensitive to 
the number of graduates,” and concedes that this favors large schools such as Georgetown and Texas and hurts 
smaller schools.  It is unclear why Leiter chose to include these two measures in his ranking formula knowing the 
bias it introduces.  See Leiter, supra note 15.
19 Leiter states that he studied the “usual suspects for the top law schools,” “two schools on the cusp of this elite 
group.” and four “very reputable, but presumably less national schools” only “as a check on the reliability of the 
results.” Id. Such assumptions are unfounded and no prior research supported such claims.  Rather than coming to 
such a conclusion before conducting his study and limiting his research to such a small number of schools, Leiter 
should have examined every ABA-accredited law school.
20
 In the research design and methodology sections, I will elaborate more on the flaws with Leiter’s study and what 
steps should have been taken to avoid the errors he introduced.
21 See generally American Bar Association, National Lawyer Population By State (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2004nbroflawyersbystate.pdf (quantifying the supply of practicing American 
lawyers, which currently stands at more than one million); BizStats, Size of U.S. Markets By Industry (2003), 
available at http://www.bizstats.com/marketsizes.htm (estimating the dollar value of the demand for legal services, 
which was about $170 billion in 2001).
5firms I examine only represent five to ten percent of the entire legal employment market,22 such 
firms generally hire many recent law graduates23 and pay the highest starting salaries.  Many 
prospective and current law students aspire to such jobs, and are genuinely interested in 
maximizing their chances at getting hired by such a firm.24  Furthermore, the data necessary to 
examine elite firm placement is easily accessible.  While I acknowledge the demand for analysis 
of judicial clerkship placement or public interest hiring, such studies are fodder for other 
researchers.
Which Firms Were Studied?
There is no consensus on what constitutes an elite law firm.  My first challenge, then, 
involved distinguishing elite law firms from other law firms.  This was no easy task.  Ultimately, 
I settled on this definition: An elite law firm is both prestigious and profitable.  Not seeking to 
reinvent the wheel, I relied on two law firm commercial rankings – Vault and the American 
Lawyer – to measure these characteristics.
Why prestige and profitability?  Simply put, these two factors represent the external and 
internal opportunities available to a typical associate.  Prestige represents an associate’s external 
opportunities.  While some associates may strive for partnership, the tournament nature of the 
partnership track dictates that most associates will leave their initial law firm prior to their 
partnership review.  In fact, many associates join an elite firm without having any intention of 
ever making partner.25  Such individuals may gain many tangible benefits from working at a 
more prestigious firm – most importantly, greater lateral opportunities.  Thus, by maximizing 
firm prestige, an individual may maximize his or her chances of obtaining a more desirable 
second job.
Just as prestige represents external opportunities, profitability represents internal 
opportunities.  Although more and more associates are entering firms without intending to make 
partner, a significant number of associates continue to join with hopes to become partners one 
day.  For these individuals, profitability represents the carrot at the end of the stick – by choosing 
a law firm based on its profitability, individuals maximize potential future earnings.  However, 
profitability serves as an indicator of quality even to those who do not wish to become partner.  
Profitability may correlate with other factors employees find desirable.  For instance, a very 
profitable firm may provide its associates with greater job security, relative to firms that are less 
profitable.
A. Vault Rank: A Proxy for Prestige
22
 Wehrli estimated that 4.7% of attorneys working in the United States in 1997 were employed by the nation’s top 
100 firms.  See John Wehrli, Interesting Statistics About the Nation’s Largest Law Firms (1996), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/19980118225715/wehrli.ilrg.com/lawfirmstats.html.
23
 My research found 15,293 graduates of the classes of 2001, 2002, and 2003 are currently working at these firms. 
24 See generally http://www.autoadmit.com/main.php?forum_id=2&hid=172 (discussing legal employment, 
particularly placement at elite law firms).
25
 Kordana argues that associates choose to work at these firms primarily to improve their lawyering skills and 
enhance their human capital.  See generally Kevin A. Kordana, Law Firms and Associate Careers: Tournament 
Theory Versus the Production-Imperative Model, 104 YALE L.J. 1907 (1995).
6“Prestige,” like “elite law firm,” is a term rather hard to define.  It is a highly subjective 
concept, and no consensus has been reached as to what makes one firm more prestigious than 
another.  For this study’s purposes, I have defined a firm’s prestige as “how the firm is perceived 
by its peers relative to other firms.”  While every individual might have his or her own idea of 
prestige, by aggregating many individuals’ perceptions, one can still get a good idea of how a 
firm is perceived relative to its peers.
As with any qualitative concept, prestige is difficult to quantify.  Thankfully, Vault has 
made a significant attempt to quantify law firm prestige:
How does Vault come up with its list of the Top 100 firms in the country? The first step is to compile a list 
of the most renowned law firms in the land by reviewing the feedback we receive from previous surveys, 
consulting our previous lists, poring over legal newspapers, talking to lawyers in the field and checking out 
other published rankings. This year, our list was made up of 150 law firms. We asked these 150 law firms 
to distribute a password-protected online survey to their associates. In total 14,052 attorneys returned 
anonymous surveys to Vault. Associates from all over the country and the world responded. We heard from 
lawyers in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Palo Alto, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Houston, 
Dallas, Washington, D.C., Miami, Cleveland, Seattle, Orlando, Phoenix and Atlanta, among many other 
domestic locations, not to mention London, Paris and beyond. The online survey asked attorneys to score 
each of the 150 law firms on a scale of 1 to 10 based how prestigious it is to work for the firm. Associates 
were asked to ignore any firm with which they were unfamiliar and were not allowed to rank their own 
firm. 
We collected all the surveys and averaged the score for each firm. The firms were then ranked in order, 
starting with the highest average prestige score as No. 1 on down to determine the Vault Top 100. 
Remember that in the Top 100, Vault is not assessing firms by profit, size, lifestyle, number of deals or 
quality of service; we are ranking the most prestigious law firms based on the perceptions of currently 
practicing lawyers at peer firms.26
While Vault’s rankings are certainly not without flaws and biases, they represent the best proxy 
available for law firm prestige, and current law students are known to consult the annual Vault 
rankings during the employment process.27  Therefore, I chose to include in my dataset every law 
firm ranked in the Vault Top 100 as well as the Vault “Best of the Rest.”
B. The American Lawyer Profits Per Partner Rankings
While prestige is an important factor, it is by far not the only one.  Law firms are 
ultimately businesses, and one of the best indicators of any business’s success is its profitability.  
Although prestige and profitability often go hand in hand, that is not often the case.  Some firms, 
while greatly respected by their peers, are not commercially successful, whereas others generate 
millions in yearly profits but do not command the same respect as many less profitable firms.  
Unfortunately, there is no one resource that lists every single law firm in the country and 
its profits per equity partner (hereafter referred to as “PPP”).  The American Lawyer, however, 
26
 Vault, Rankings Methodology (2004), available at
http://www.vault.com/nr/lawrankings.jsp?law2005=7&ch_id=242.
27 See generally http://www.autoadmit.com/main.php?forum_id=2&hid=223 (discussing the Vault law firm 
rankings).
7comes close in its annual ranking of American Lawyer Top 200 law firms based on PPP.28
Almost all Vault firms appear on the American Lawyer’s list, as well as several firms not ranked 
by Vault.  Given the importance of PPP, I also included these firms in my dataset.29
Some have suggested that I should have used revenue per lawyer (RPL) rather than PPP.  
I concede that RPL is a useful measure of a law firm’s quality, and when judging a firm’s 
financial viability one might want to examine RPL in conjunction with, or instead of, PPP.  
However, I chose not to use RPL because I do not believe it is as strong a measure of an 
associate’s potential internal opportunities.  Although I concede that PPP is open to some 
manipulation,30 it is a better measure of the benefits that come with being an equity partner than 
RPL.
Which Offices Were Studied?
Unlike Leiter and others, I did not limit myself to only studying a firm’s main office, or 
headquarters.  Every domestic office of every Vault and AmLaw PPP firm was studied, for a 
total of 1295 offices.  I excluded international offices in order to avoid the difficulties inherent in 
such an undertaking.  The following table provides a geographical breakdown of the offices 
examined:
LOCATION OF OFFICES
AK 7 GA 27 MI 20 NJ 39 SC 6
AL 1 IA 3 MN 6 NM 2 TN 6
AZ 12 ID 3 MO 11 NV 6 TX 110
CA 262 IL 58 MS 1 NY 139 UT 9
CO 27 IN 11 MT 3 OH 33 VA 39
CT 22 KS 4 NC 29 OK 1 WA 14
DC 142 LA 4 ND 1 OR 9 WI 12
DE 17 MA 35 NE 2 PA 56 WV 1
FL 82 MD 39 NH 2 RI 3 WY 2
Gathering the Data
The data collection phase was conducted from December 2004 to January 2005.31  I 
specifically chose this period to ensure that most of the Class of 2003’s law clerks would have 
finished their clerkships and, if they were planning to enter private practice, join a law firm as an 
28 See The American Lawyer, supra note 10.
29
 I acknowledge that some prestigious and profitable “boutique” law firms might have been omitted from my 
dataset because they are ranked by neither Vault nor the American Lawyer.  Unfortunately, no researcher will ever 
have the unlimited time and unlimited resources required to do a completely perfect and flawless job.  At some 
point, the researcher must make a judgment call and decide when to move on with the project – in this case, I chose 
to draw the line at Vault’s 150 most prestigious firms and the American Lawyer’s top 200 firms in PPP.  I do not 
believe the omission of such boutique firms had a significant impact on my findings, since they are few in number 
and there is no reason to believe that schools differ significantly in the percentage of the graduating class that wishes 
to work at a boutique instead of a Vault or AmLaw firm.
30
 For instance, some firms may inflate their PPP by making heavy use of non-equity partners.
31
 Although I use the first person singular throughout this section, I had the help of two research assistants – Walter 
Harris Chen and Alex Tsaivos – during the data collection process.  While they contributed to the creation of the 
dataset, the resulting data analysis and conclusions are my own.
8associate.  I visited the website of every law firm on either the Vault Top 100, the Vault Best of 
the Rest, or the AmLaw PPP Top 200 list, in approximate rank order.32
I excluded 2001, 2002, and 2003 graduates who earned a JD or JD-equivalent law degree 
in a foreign country, even if they had earned an American LLM.33  For the handful of graduates 
who had earned both an American JD and a foreign law degree, I took note of the American JD 
but not the foreign law degree.34  Similarly, for the small number of JD graduates who had an 
American JD and an American LLM, I counted the JD but not the LLM.35  I had also decided 
beforehand to not include non-ABA accredited schools.36
Some might wonder why I examined individual firm websites rather than use the online 
Martindale-Hubbell directory, as previous researchers have done.  Martindale-Hubbell's online 
directory is an incomplete and inconsistent source of information.  Several law firms only submit 
biographical information to Martindale-Hubbell about their partners and counsel, and do not 
provide the names of their associates, let alone where they went to law school.   To illustrate just 
how much damage excluding a firm’s associates can have, I’ll use a concrete example.  Two of 
the three elite New York firms Leiter and Sullivan examined have not included their associates 
in the online Martindale-Hubbell directory – Cravath, Swaine & Moore and Sullivan & 
Cromwell.  According to the dataset Sullivan released, Martindale-Hubbell’s search engine 
found 19 Columbia Law graduates working at Cravath.  However, according to Cravath’s own 
search engine, there are 87 Columbia Law graduates working there – including 69 associates not 
in Martindale-Hubbell!37
I obtained graduation year and JD school for virtually every law firm in my study through 
their websites.  However, a small number of law firms did not include graduation years in their 
attorney profiles or, in an even smaller number of firms, did not include associate biographies at 
32 At each law firm website, I examined the section containing attorney profiles or biographies, with the goal of 
determining the number of 2001, 2002, and 2003 law school graduates at each firm and which law school conferred 
his or her JD.  At a very small minority of firms, I was able to use a search engine to display all associates in order 
of law school graduation year.  However, most firms did not have such a feature, so to gather this data I manually 
examined every associate’s biography or directory listing and took note of each associate’s graduation year and law 
school for every 2001, 2002, or 2003 graduate.  For the small minority of firms that did not distinguish between 
associates and partners in their attorney listings, I examined every attorney at the firm.
33
 The primary reason I chose to exclude holders of non-American law degrees and American LLMs is lack of 
information on the geographical and sectoral preferences of foreign law school graduates and LLM students. 
34
 Most of these individuals were part of joint degree programs where one earns a foreign law degree, usually from 
Britain or France, along with the American JD.  Multiple American law schools offer such programs, such as 
Cornell.
35
 Virtually all 2001, 2002, and 2003 JD graduates I encountered had only a JD, and a significant portion of JD/LLM 
graduates earned their LLM from the same institution as their JD (Cornell, Duke, and NYU in particular have 
popular JD/LLM options).  Furthermore, many of the individuals who had a JD and an LLM earned the LLM part 
time while working for their firm.  Therefore, I do not believe counting JD-conferring institutions but not counting 
LLM-conferring institutions had any meaningful impact on my findings.
36
 I chose to exclude non-ABA schools because I do not have data on their geographical and sectoral preferences, for 
U.S. News does not profile non-ABA schools.  However, this became a moot point since I did not encounter any 
2001, 2002, or 2003 graduates of non-ABA schools at any of the firms studied.
37 See Michael Sullivan, Methodology (2005), available at 
http://www.calvin.edu/admin/csr/students/sullivan/law/method.htm.
9all on their website.  For these firms, I had no choice but to use Martindale-Hubbell.38  I did not 
use the Martindale-Hubbell search engine to get my results.  I do not believe that Martindale’s 
search engine is reliable for this sort of study, since it does not distinguish between associates 
and non-associates, and includes LLM graduates along with JD graduates.  Similarly, it is 
impossible to search for every single different permutation of a law school’s name – while some 
associates might list their law school in Martindale as “UC Berkeley,” others may list it as “U.C. 
Berkeley,” “UCB,” “the University of California at Berkeley,” “the University of California @ 
Berkeley,” “Boalt Hall,” “Boalt School of Law” or countless other variations that a simple search 
would miss.  Instead, as with law firm website biographies, I examined the Martindale-Hubbell 
individual directory listing of every associate listed as being a part of the relevant firm, and 
obtained graduation year and JD-conferring institution from those individual listings.  When 
graduation year was not listed, bar admissions year was used as a proxy.39  For the very small 
number of firms that did not list graduation dates or bar admissions dates on their websites or on 
Martindale, I prorated the firm’s associates.40
II. Underlying Assumptions & Methodology
Assumptions
In an ideal world, researchers would have access to perfect information and would not 
have to make any assumptions.  However, as discussed earlier, law schools have released 
astonishingly little information about job placement and the elite firm employment process, and 
much of the information that has been released is not standardized and, in most cases, is also 
incomplete.  When faced with such little information, any researcher attempting to study law 
school employment placement will have no choice but to make several assumptions.  Before 
discussing the nuts and bolts of my methodology, I will briefly explain and justify the 
assumptions I had to make to pursue this study. 
A. Regional Preferences
When adjusting for region, I had no choice but to assume that students choose their initial 
job based on its geographic location.  That is, students who want to work in the Middle Atlantic 
region will actually work in the Middle Atlantic region after graduation.  I feel this is a 
reasonable assumption for the average student; however, I know this might not always be the 
case for all students.  Some markets are tougher to break into than others, and individuals may 
have to make trade-offs.  For example, an individual who seeks to work in Boston might have 
problems getting an elite firm job in that region, but may have an easier time getting an elite firm 
38
 All law firms examined through Martindale-Hubbell included their associates in the directory, so the Cravath and 
Sullivan problem is not duplicated for any firm in this study.
39
 I took into account that different states schedule their swearing-in ceremonies on different dates.  For instance, I 
know that an individual who graduated law school in 2002 and passed the New York bar exam in summer 2002 
would not be formally admitted to the bar until early 2003.   I also understand that using bar admissions as a proxy 
for graduation year has some error involved – for example, some clerks do not take the bar exam the summer before 
they clerk, but take the bar exam after their clerkship finishes.  However, the number of associates I looked up in 
Martindale and used bar admissions year as a proxy for graduation year is insignificant compared to the total size of 
my dataset, and thus would not impact my overall findings in any meaningful way. 
40
 The only firms prorated were Cravath, Shearman, Cahill, and LeBoef..
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job in New York.  When deciding between making $50,000 in Boston and $125,000 plus bonus 
in New York, such an individual may choose to work in New York even if Boston is his or her
preferred geographic location.  In addition, some individuals may have very weak geographical 
preferences, and may conduct a job search that spans two, three, or perhaps even four regions.  
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent me from taking this behavior into account.  To proceed, I 
have no choice but to assume that the typical student who wants to work in the Middle Atlantic 
will work in the Middle Atlantic after graduation.  
B. Sectoral Preferences
Similarly, when making sectoral adjustments I had to assume that individuals 
choose what sector they wish to work in and are not forced into a sector by economic necessity.  
For instance, I have to assume that an individual working at a public interest organization is 
working in public interest because he wants to, and not because he could not get a job at a law 
firm.  In reality grades might impact whether an individual works at a law firm or in a lower 
paying occupation such as public interest.  There is some evidence to support this criticism.  In 
their study of legal education and entry into the legal profession, Kornhauser and Revesz 
concluded that up until a certain threshold, students at NYU and Michigan with low grades were 
significantly more likely to work in public interest rather than in elite law firms.41  Once this 
GPA threshold was surpassed, however, GPA no longer had any predictive power on job choice.  
Presumably, individuals with GPAs below the threshold were forced into selecting public 
interest jobs because they were unable to work at an elite law firm, whereas individuals with 
GPAs above the threshold were able to choose between working for elite law firms and working 
for prestigious public interest organizations.  I acknowledge that this GPA threshold may vary 
substantially among schools of differing reputation.  For example, I do not doubt that the GPA 
threshold at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, where 55% of 2002 graduates were 
unemployed at graduation, is higher than the GPA threshold at the University of Michigan Law 
School, where only 7.3% of 2002 graduates were unemployed at graduation.42  Although my 
measure of the depth of placement at schools such as Cooley might be inflated in my rankings 
because a larger portion of the student body might have chosen to work in public interest out of 
economic necessity rather than by true choice, I do not believe that higher ranked schools suffer 
from this bias.  While some students at the very bottom of the class might choose public interest 
employment out of economic necessity even though they would prefer to work for a law firm, 
there is no reason to believe that a higher percentage of Columbia or Duke students are forced 
into public interest jobs than NYU or Michigan students. 
C. Firm Quality Maximization
Lastly, I assume that students will seek to maximize firm quality.  That is, students would 
rather work at the most prestigious and most profitable firm possible in their region of choice.  I 
believe this assumption holds true on average, for the more prestigious and more profitable a 
41
 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of 
Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829 (1995).
42
 U.S. News, The Top 100 Law Schools (2005), available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrank_brief.php. (U.S. News premium login required 
for access.)
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firm, the greater the external and internal opportunities available to its employees.  However, I 
acknowledge that some individuals will turn down offers from higher ranked firms and instead 
choose to work for lower ranked firms in the same region.  Individuals might do this for a variety 
of reasons.  For example, interested in tax law may choose a lower ranked firm because although 
it is lower ranked as a whole, its tax practice group is highly prestigious and better regarded than 
the tax groups at higher ranked firms.  Others might choose lower ranked firms over higher 
ranked ones if the lower ranked firms require fewer billable hours or offer a better chance at 
becoming partner.  Unfortunately, since no law school releases offer acceptance information to 
the general public, it is impossible to determine whether this practice is widespread.
I do not believe this is a consequential source of error.  Even if some individuals engage 
in this practice, there is no reason to believe that the average Penn student is significantly more 
likely than the average Texas or Duke student to turn down a higher ranked firm for a lower 
ranked firm.  As long as there is little or no differentiation from school to school, my assumption 
is reasonable.  In his paper, Korobkin observed that students in the aggregate “tend to wish to 
work for the most prestigious legal employers, or at least to keep open the option of doing so.”43
No evidence has been presented to cast doubt on this statement.
Adjustments to Total Class Size (n)
Having addressed the underlying assumptions, it is now time to discuss the various 
adjustments I made to the Total Class Size (n) variable.  I reference Leiter’s employment 
placement study in order to demonstrate why some of these adjustments are necessary.
A. JD Graduates
Leiter included LLM classes as part of a school's total class size in his study.44 Such an 
inclusion results in negative bias towards schools with LLM programs geared towards 
international students.  Many graduates of such programs do not intend to practice in the United 
States but instead return to their home countries to work after graduation.  Moreover, including 
LLM graduates introduces an element that makes a rankings set a poor resource for prospective 
JD students who do not intend to pursue an LLM.  Because LLM career placement is not the 
focus of my research, I excluded LLM students from a school’s n, and only included JD students.
B.  Period Studied
In order to determine which law schools are doing a good job placing their students at 
elite firms, one must examine contemporary hiring trends. In his employment study, Leiter did 
not limit his study to associates hired within the last few years.  Instead, he studied all attorneys 
hired at these firms, whether they were non-partnership track counsel who graduated in the early 
43
 Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems,
77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 409 (1998).
44 Leiter justifies this inclusion by pointing out that Martindale-Hubbell's search engine does not distinguish between 
JD graduates and LLM graduates, and therefore he has to include LLM classes as part of total class size to avoid 
artificially raising the rankings of schools with large LLM programs, such as Georgetown and NYU. See Leiter, 
supra note 15. However, this source of error could have been avoided entirely if Leiter had gathered his data using 
firm websites instead, which not only distinguish between JD and LLM graduates, but are also more reliable. 
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1990s, senior partners who graduated in the 1960s, or first year associates who graduated in 
2002.  Leiter acknowledges this problem, and concedes that his study “reflect[s] not only who 
Ropes & Gray was hiring in 1995, but some of whom they were hiring in 1970.” Leiter also 
acknowledges that this bias had a significant impact on his rankings: schools like Michigan and 
Duke, which Leiter claims were more prominent in the past, may be artificially inflated in his 
rankings, while schools like NYU, which may not have been as well regarded in the past but 
have risen to greater prominence in recent years, may be low ranked relative to their 
contemporary placement.  Leiter attempts to circumvent this problem by stating that his study 
“invariably reflects a school's reputation among elite firms over a long period of time.”  
Although this may be true, and while his study may have academic merit, it has little practical 
value for prospective law students or other interested parties, who are primarily concerned with 
contemporary hiring trends.45
In order to isolate contemporary hiring trends, only associates who graduated in 2001, 
2002, and 2003 were examined.  Therefore, I began by limiting each school’s n to the classes of
2001-2003, having obtained these class sizes from the American Bar Association’s Official 
Guide to Law Schools.
C.  Domestic Cohort
As stated earlier, I chose to examine only domestic firm offices.  Because individuals 
who have chosen to work abroad are not relevant to domestic placement, I adjusted n by 
removing the percentage of each graduating class that works outside of the United States.  This 
information for every school was procured from U.S. News.46
D. Private Sector Domestic Cohort
When making per capita adjustments, Leiter divided the total number of attorneys by 
graduating class size.  However, the percentage of students who choose to go into law firms is 
not constant among law schools.  According to the 2005 edition of U.S. News’s law school 
rankings guide, 80% of Columbia Law School's graduating class of 2002 was employed at a law 
firm.  In contrast, only 72% of NYU’s graduating class of 2002 was employed at a law firm.   
Since NYU graduates are entering private practice at lower rates than Columbia graduates, one 
can expect that using total class size, all else equal, would artificially inflate Columbia’s ranking 
relative to NYU’s. Other researchers have acknowledged this problem in their studies.  Wehrli 
notes that Harvard ranked higher than Yale in his study even though its class is three times larger 
because “a higher % of Yale grades [sic] enter government service and politics than Harvard.”47
Since I am only examining elite law firm placement, I must adjust the domestic cohort so 
that it only reflects those who have made the decision to work in private practice.  The 
percentage of students who go into the private sector varies from school to school.  To account 
45 See Leiter, supra note 15.
46
 I had to use geographic data for the class of 2002 because data for the class of 2003 is not yet available and data 
for the class of 2001 is no longer available.  I am assuming that geographic distribution does not differ significantly 
from year to year.
47 See Wehrli, supra note 15.
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for student sectoral preferences, I used the sectoral data available in U.S. News to remove from 
each school’s n the students who went into academia, public interest, business, and other non-
firm endeavors. 48
Judicial clerks posed a dilemma.  While clerkships are listed as a separate sector in U.S. 
News, in reality clerkships are only temporary positions for the overwhelming majority of 
students.  Students will typically clerk for a year or two, and then enter another sector, such as 
private practice or academia.  Hence, I cannot simply factor out clerks from n the same way I
factored out other sectors, seeing as a significant number of clerks will enter private practice.
To properly adjust for clerks, I had to make one additional assumption – that the post-
clerkship sectoral preferences of judicial clerks mirror the sectoral preferences of non-clerks.  
That is, if 75% of School X’s non-clerks go into private practice after graduation, I assume that 
75% of School X’s clerks go into private practice once their clerkships end.  
Data on post-clerkship employment preferences is virtually non-existent.  In fact, I only 
know of one data point available: a Yale Law School study of its 1999-2004 graduates found that 
73% of clerks entered private practice after clerking.49  My assumption projected that 69% of 
Yale 2001-2003 clerks enter private practice after clerking.  While my method clearly is not free 
of error, the difference does not appear too significant and there is no reason to believe that the 
error is not evenly distributed among all law schools.
E. Regional Cohorts
Arguably the most significant methodological flaw of Leiter’s study was his failure to 
adjust for regional preferences.  Student geographical preferences vary from school to school.  
For example, according to the 2005 edition of the U.S. News law school rankings guide, 78% of 
Columbia's 2002 graduating class settled in the Middle Atlantic (NY, PA, NJ) region, while only 
6% settled in the Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA) region.  In contrast, 9% of Berkeley's 2002 
graduating class settled in the Middle Atlantic region, while 75% settled in the Pacific region.   
Of the 45 firms Leiter studied, only seven are located in the Middle Atlantic region, while twelve 
are located in the Pacific region.  The problem is even more apparent than it seems.  Within these 
regions certain states dominated – 77% of Columbia graduates stayed in New York, and 69% of 
Berkeley graduates stayed in California.   However, while Leiter only studied three New York 
firms, Leiter included seven California firms, which artificially raised the rankings of schools 
like Berkeley, UCLA, and Stanford, while artificially lowering the rankings of schools that place 
a large proportion of graduates in the Northeast such as Columbia, NYU, Penn and Cornell. 
Why does this matter?  In order for Leiter’s rankings to have any efficacy, one needs to 
assume that students do not have any geographic preferences whatsoever, and will choose jobs 
based solely upon prestige. Although firm prestige certainly has a major impact on choice of 
job, it is fair to say that most students primarily pick their jobs first based on location.  Leiter 
concedes this point in his study, and poses the rhetorical question, “How many [students] pick 
48
 U.S. News, supra note 42.
49 Yale Law School, 5 Year Career Development Survey: Class of 1998 (2003), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/pdf/Career_ Development/cdo-summary_of_98dataonly.pdf.
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Columbia with the goal of big firm practice in Dallas or Portland?”50  I agree with Leiter's point 
– as the employment location charts in U.S. News show, few Columbia students choose to 
practice in Dallas or Portland.    In other words, one would have to assume that a Columbia 
student would rather work at the #1 Dallas firm rather than the #5 New York firm – an 
assumption that neither I nor probably Leiter are willing to accept.
My final adjustment to n involves creating nine different n values – one for each regional 
cohort.  As discussed previously, to conduct this study I must assume that law students have 
clear geographical preferences.  When measuring School X’s employment placement relative to 
School Y, I could not simply measure raw national placement if students at the two schools have 
differing geographical preferences.  In order to compare these schools, I had to examine how 
School X’s private sector domestic cohort in the New England region places relative to School 
Y’s private sector domestic cohort in the New England region, and so on for every geographical 
region.
Ideally, one would divide the United States into many very small regions.  Unfortunately, 
this cannot be done, for U.S. News, the only standardized source for regional preferences, breaks 
down the United States into nine rather large regions:
Region 1:  New England – CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT
Region 2:  Mid Atlantic – NJ, NY, PA
Region 3:  Midwest – IL, IN, MI, OH, WI
Region 4:  West North Central – IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD
Region 5:  South Atlantic – DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV
Region 6:  East South Central – AL, KY, MS, TN
Region 7:  West South Central – AR, LA, OK, TX
Region 8:  Rocky Mountains – AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY
Region 9: Pacific – AK, CA, HI, OR, WA
Although there is some error involved in using this regional breakdown, no better standardized 
alternative exists.51
Measuring Placement Success
When measuring a school’s placement success in a given region, one must consider two 
variables: depth of placement, and quality of placement.  Depth of placement, more commonly 
50 See Leiter, supra note 15.
51
 There are two significant issues related to using U.S. News data for this purpose.  First, U.S. News regional 
employment distributions are not completely accurate for all schools.  Fordham, for example, reported to U.S. News
that it did not know what regions 10% of its graduates were located.  Similarly, Cardozo submitted regional 
distributions that added up to 102% rather than 100%.  I corrected for this by prorating these problematic 
distributions.  Second, U.S. News regions do not correspond well with the size of legal markets.  By putting 
secondary legal markets like Pennsylvania in the same region as very large markets like New York, schools such as 
the University of Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Washington, and countless others that 
send significant portions of their student body to secondary markets are severely underrated in my study.  In fact, a 
school could theoretically place better in New York, better in New Jersey, and better in Pennsylvania than any of its 
peer schools, yet still be ranked lower than in its peer schools in the Middle Atlantic region as a whole because of 
the disparity in the number of jobs in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
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referred to as per capita placement (PCP), represents how successful a school is in placing its 
students at elite firms.  A high PCP rate generally indicates that elite firms are willing to dig deep 
into the school’s class when making hiring decisions.  Quality of placement, which one can 
quantify by developing at a composite of mean Vault/PPP rank, represents the type of firm where 
a typical graduate will work.  A high PCP rate combined with a high mean Vault/PPP rank 
indicates that a law school not only places its students well at elite firms, but places them at the 
most elite of the elite firms.
I was able to combine depth and quality in one single variable: total quality score (TQS).  
The regional TQS equation for School Z is represented as 
TQSz = ½( qzvmu + qzpppu)
Where qzvmu represents mean Vault rank and qzpppu represents mean PPP rank.  I obtained qzvmu 
and qzpppu through the following equations:
(qzvmu) = [F1z*(q1v)+ F2z *(q2v)+ F3z *(q3v)+…+ FNz *(qNv) + Uz*(250) ] / (F1z + F2z + F3z +…+ 
FNz + Uz)
(qzpppu) = [F1z*(q1ppp)+ F2z *(q2ppp)+ F3z *(q3ppp)+…+ FNz *(qNppp) + Uz*(250)] / (F1z + F2z + F3z
+…+ FNz + Uz)
In these equations, F represents the number of individuals at a given school working at one of the 
elite firms examined, and U represents individuals from the school’s domestic private sector 
cohort who do not work at any of the elite firms.  qv represents a firm’s Vault rank52, and qPPP  
represents a firm’s PPP rank.53
Adjusting Regional TQS to Account for Differing Labor Market Conditions
The labor market for lawyers differs from region to region.  Some regions have more elite 
jobs available than others, and one region may have a significantly greater ratio of job seekers to 
available jobs relative to another.  In order to compare School Z’s performance in Region A 
relative to its performance in Region B, one needs to adjust for these differences.
52
 For 2001 graduates, a firm’s Vault rank was obtained from the 2002 Vault guide.  For 2002 graduates it was 
obtained from the 2003 guide, and for 2003 graduates from the 2004 guide.  Law students typically make final 
employment decisions during their third year of law school.  While it is true that many law students, especially those 
at higher ranked schools, end up working for the firm they summered with during 2L summer, and thus may have 
used an older version of the Vault rankings than I am using here, many individuals may attempt to “trade up” 
employers during 3L OCI or, particularly at lower ranked schools that traditionally place poorly, may obtain an 
initial job offer during or immediately after 3L year.  Given that the number of schools where virtually everyone 
obtains a firm job through 2L OCI is significantly smaller than the number of schools where most employment 
outcomes are determined during the 3L year, I feel using Vault rankings available during 3L year is more 
appropriate than Vault rankings available during 2L year.  However, given how Vault rank does not fluctuate too 
much for most firms, this issue is probably moot.
53
 Firms in Vault’s “Best of the Rest” received a Vault score of 150, and firms on the AmLaw PPP list but not 
ranked by Vault received a Vault score of 200.  The U group received Vault and PPP scores of 250.  
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In order to make this adjustment, for each region, I calculated a benchmark TQS, which 
represents the placement of a fictitious “average school” in each region.  I calculated average 
school TQS for region r using the same equations used earlier
(qrvmu) = [F1r*(q1v)+ F2r *(q2v)+ F3r *(q3v)+…+ FNr *(qNv) + Ur*(250) ] / (F1r + F2r + F3r +…+ FNr 
+ Ur)
(qrpppu) = [F1r*(q1ppp)+ F2r *(q2ppp)+ F3r *(q3ppp)+…+ FNr *(qNppp) + Ur*(250)] / (F1r + F2r + F3r
+…+ FNr + Ur)
TQSr = ½( qrvmu + qrpppu)
where Fr represents every associate working at each law firm in region r, regardless of school 
attended, and Ur represents every private sector job seeker in region r.54  The following table lists 
raw TQS measures for the average school in each region.  The larger the TQS value, the fewer, 
and less prestigious, jobs there are in a given region relative to the number of job seekers.  
Region Raw (unadjusted) TQS
Region 1: New England 216.33
Region 2: Mid Atlantic 190.00
Region 3: Midwest 223.80
Region 4: West North Central 240.52
Region 5: South Atlantic 213.52
Region 6: East South Central 247.52
Region 7: West South Central 226.82
Region 8: Rocky Mountains 241.99
Region 9: Pacific 213.59
As the table shows, Vault/AmLaw jobs are most plentiful in Region 2 relative to the 
number of job seekers, and are scarcest in Region 6.  In order to adjust for these disparities in 
raw TQS, regional TQS values for all schools were transformed to a 0 to 100 point scale.  On 
this scale, 50 represents the fictitious average school’s placement in the region.
Schools with scores above 50 place above average in their region, and schools with 
scores below 50 place below average in their region.  Because of the many problems that arise 
from low sample sizes, schools that did not send more than 20 students to a region over the three 
year period examined were not ranked in that region.  In addition, Rutgers-Camden and Rutgers-
Newark are not ranked in any region, because most firm biographies listed “Rutgers University 
School of Law” as an associate’s degree-granting institution without differentiating between the 
two campuses.  Regional TQS values for schools in each region are located in Appendix A.
This method of regional adjustment is associated with two desirable properties.  First, it 
allows the researcher to account for the varying difficulty of finding employment in each region.  
That is, if there are fewer jobs available in Region 1 than in Region 2, all else equal, schools that 
54
 Many thanks to Aaron Chalfin for his help in developing this formula.
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place a large proportion of their graduates in Region 1 will have a lower rate of placement in 
elite firms.  Second, this method of regional adjustment allows the researcher to account for 
transitory differences in regional hiring markets as a result of the varying strength of regional 
economies.  For example, the recent recession has not affected all regions in the United States
equally.  Region 9, especially California, suffered particularly ill effects.  As such regional
placement of schools that place a disproportionate number of graduates in the California market 
might reasonably have been expected to have been lower from 2001-2003.  Because any regional 
slump is already built into the benchmark TQS system, no further adjustments for 
macroeconomic conditions in regional markets are necessary.
III. National Rankings
Aggregating Across Regions
As stated earlier, one cannot create a national ranking merely by looking at raw PCPs or 
raw mean quality ranks, due to the differences in regional labor markets.  To develop a national 
TQS measure, one must aggregate the regional rankings.  However, there is still the dilemma of 
how to aggregate.  
Two possible aggregation schemes immediately come to mind: aggregation by market 
share, and aggregation by student preferences.  In aggregation by market share, each region is 
assigned a weight based on its share of the legal employment market.  For example, if the Middle 
Atlantic region compromises 33% of the market, placement in the Middle Atlantic region will 
compromise 33% of the national TQS figure for every school.  The formula for aggregation by 
market share would look like this:
TQSNmz = r1*(TQS1z) + r2*(TQS2z) + r3*(TQS3z) + … + r9*(TQS9z)
where r represents market share.  In aggregation by student preferences, each region is weighted 
based on the regional preferences of students at each school.  For example, if 80% of School X’s 
students work in the Middle Atlantic region, Middle Atlantic placement would comprise 80% of 
national TQ S.  In contrast, if only 1% of School Y’s students work in the Middle Atlantic region, 
Middle Atlantic placement would only comprise 1% of national TQS.  The formula for 
aggregation by student preferences would look like this:
TQSNpz = p1z*(TQS1z) + p2z *(TQS2z) + p3z *(TQS3z) + … + p9z *(TQS9z)
where p represents the percentage of the school’s student body working in the region.
Unfortunately, there is no one model that obviously stands out as correct – both models 
have their pros and cons.  However, I have elected to use Model A, aggregation by market share, 
for purposes of the national rankings presented in this paper.  While Model B might be useful as 
a measure of rating career services offices, it is not useful as a tool for prospective law students, 
who may have preferences that differ significantly from the preferences of students at those 
schools.  When attempting to measure national opportunities, it makes sense to assume that the 
average prospective student may have preferences in line with market share, and find rankings 
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based on market share useful.  Although it is true that not all people conduct a truly national job 
search and even fewer people have regional preferences that are exactly in line with market share 
without any deviation, no other alternative model is attractive.  Model B has the added 
disadvantage of ranking schools using criteria that are not consistent from school to school –
while School A might have New England placement weighed as 1% and Pacific placement as 
35%, School B might have New England placement weighed as 90% and Pacific placement as 
0%.  When attempting to measure national opportunities, uniformity is necessary, and Model A 
provides that uniformity.  Individuals who disagree with my use of Model A for the national 
rankings can rely on the regional rankings, or go to the AutoAdmit.com website and create their 
own national rankings using my dataset.
As with the regional rankings, the raw national TQS values were adjusted to ensure that 
the average school receives a 50 score.  Schools that score above a 50 place above average 
nationally, and schools that score below a 50 place below average nationally.  Because this is a 
national ranking, schools that did not send a minimum of 20 graduates to at least two 
geographical regions during the three year period studied were excluded from the national
rankings.  While a national TQS value was calculated for every law school that met the two 
region requirement, Appendix B will only include schools that placed a minimum of 50 
associates over the three year period studied.  Individuals interested in seeing national TQS 
levels for all law schools are once again encouraged to visit AutoAdmit.com, where the entire 
dataset shall be available.
IV. What Influences National Employment Placement?
These regional and national rankings, while interesting, are not the meat and potatoes of 
this paper.  Although this paper thus far has focused on calculating TQS, ordinal rankings based 
on TQS measures alone will have only limited utility to current or prospective students, or to 
career services professionals.  Although it is interesting that Chicago is ranked number one in 
national employment placement, and that Columbia is ranked significantly higher than Yale, this 
information alone means little.  I do not view these rankings as an answer in and of themselves, 
but as a starting point to ask far more important questions, such as why Chicago is ranked first, 
and what factors cause Columbia to place better than Yale.55  By answering these questions, 
55
 Some have suggested that Yale’s ranking might be deflated due to the nature of the elite law firm hiring process 
and the requirements for tenure-track positions in legal academia.  Successful candidates for a tenure-track law 
professor position typically finished in the top 5% of their graduating class from Harvard, Yale, or Stanford and 
obtained a prestigious U.S. Court of Appeals clerkship – if not a U.S. Supreme Court clerkship.  Or, to put it in other 
words, the cream of the crop goes into law teaching.  The elite law firm hiring process, however, does not coincide 
with the law professor hiring process.  Elite law firm hiring typically takes placing during the second year of law 
school, during the on-campus interviewing (OCI) process, where firms send recruiters to campus to interview 
primarily second year students for summer associate positions – positions that will almost always result in an offer 
for full-time employment being extended at the end of the summer.  However, the highly competitive clerkship 
application process does not begin until the third year of law school.  Individuals at the top of the class at Harvard, 
Yale, and Stanford contemplating legal academia will often go through OCI during the second year and work as a 
summer associate during second year summer, but, rather than returning to their summer firm after graduation, will 
take an appellate clerkship and then enter the job market for legal academics.  I do not believe this has a significant 
impact on these rankings.  The per capita placement portion of the rankings is determined by the percentage of 2001, 
2002, and 2003 graduates who ultimately work at law firms, and thus individuals who clerk but then do not return to 
their summer firm after clerking do not negatively impact Yale’s depth ranking.  However, it is possible that this 
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prospective law students will know what traits to value highly when considering law schools, 
and academic administrators can identify ways to make their student bodies more attractive to 
elite legal employers.  This chapter, although shorter than the previous ones, is without a doubt 
the most important part of this paper.
I used regression analysis to identify the factors that are significant predictors of national 
employment placement and develop a model to predict a law school’s national employment 
placement.56  This model can be represented using the following equation:
NationalTQS = -24.727 + 18.194*Reputation + 0.006*Size – 9.005*NoGrades –
9.136*Numbers + 2.446*Aplus + 6.442*NoRank + 1.440*Classes
“Reputation” represents U.S. News academic reputation rating.57  “Size” signifies total class size 
for the classes of 2001-2003.  “NoGrades” represents whether the school uses an honors/pass/fail 
grading system, where 0 = No and 1 = Yes.  “Numbers” represents whether the school uses a 
numbers-based grading system, where 0 = No and 1 = Yes.  “APlus” represents whether the 
school has an A+ or equivalent grade, where 0 = No and 1 = Yes.  “NoRank” signifies whether 
the school discloses class rank information or class rank cutoffs to either students or employers, 
where 0 = No and 1 = Yes.  Finally, “Classes” stands for the total number of classes taken during 
the first year of law school.
practice might impact the firm quality part of the rankings.  The most selective and prestigious law firms, such as 
Wachtell and Cravath, have very high hiring standards, and often only hire individuals who are at the very top of 
their law school class.  The Harvard students Wachtell hires, therefore, are the very best at Harvard – however, if 
many of those Harvard students ultimately do not accept full-time associate positions at Wachtell because they take 
an appellate clerkship and then attempt to become legal academics, Harvard's mean Vault/PPP rank would be 
artificially lower, since many individuals at the very top of Harvard's class will not be working as associates at elite 
law firms.  Schools such as Penn and Northwestern, which send significantly fewer graduates to academia, will not 
be impacted the same way, since most individuals at the top of the class who obtain appellate clerkships will 
ultimately work at a law firm after their clerkship ends.  While I acknowledge that this bias may exist in my study, I 
do not know of any way to reduce this bias any further than I already have.
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 Several readers inquired as to why I did not conduct a regression analysis on individual regions.  I posit that law 
school reputations among practitioners are characterized by heavy regional bias, and that legal employers make 
significant regional distinctions.    In its 2005 rankings, U.S. News reported that four law schools share a practitioner 
score of 3.4 – Boston University (BU), The George Washington University (GWU), the University of Washington, 
and Wake Forest University.   BU is located in Boston, GWU is located in Washington, D.C., the University of 
Washington is located in Seattle, and Wake Forest is located in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.  Putting aside the 
other problems, it may not be appropriate to apply a national practitioner rating to determine employment prospects 
of these schools that place a large proportion of their graduates in one region.  While these four schools might have 
identical national practitioner scores, these schools may not be perceived as equivalent in all regions, if any.  
Although employers in New England may view BU as a significantly better school, West Coast employers may 
consider the University of Washington superior, while employers in the South may prefer GW or Wake Forest 
graduates.  Likewise, New York employers may strongly prefer Fordham graduates to graduates of each of these 
four schools, even though Fordham’s practitioner score is lower.   If school reputation differs from region to region, 
national reputation rankings are inappropriate to use in a regression, for they do not reflect a school’s true regional 
reputation.
57
 Although I believe there are several flaws with the U.S. News academic reputation ratings, unfortunately it is the 
best proxy for institutional reputation currently available.  I did not use the U.S. News attorney/judge rating because 
the extremely low response rate for that survey makes its validity highly questionable: only 36% of the practitioners 
surveyed replied with their rankings.   With a response rate this low; the results are likely not representative of how 
the legal community views these schools. See U.S. News, supra note 7.
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Below are results of this regression:
Model Summary
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1
.930(a) .865 .833 6.15242
Coefficients(a)
a  Dependent Variable: NationalTQSb
This regression equation is very strong, for it explains 86.5% of all variation in national 
employment placement.  As the regression output table shows, five of the seven independent 
variables used in the regression are highly significant predictors of national employment 
placement.  Academic reputation and using a numbers grading system are significant at the 1% 
level, while using a no grades system and lack of class rank disclosure are significant at the 5% 
level.  The number of classes required during the first year of law school is significant at the 10% 
level.  Total class size and the presence of an A+ or equivalent grade are not significant 
predictors of national employment placement.
No one should be surprised that a school’s academic reputation is the single most 
significant predictor of its national employment placement.  However, what is surprising is that 
while reputation is a factor, it is not the sole arbiter of national employment placement.  As the 
following table illustrates, the top 15 law schools according to the U.S. News academic 
reputation rankings and the top 15 in my national employment placement rankings are not 
identical:
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant)
-24.727 9.022 -2.741 .010
Total Class 
Size .006 .004 .125 1.402 .171
US News 
Academic 
Reputation 
Rating
18.194 2.054 .820 8.860 .000
No Grades
-9.005 4.280 -.163 -2.104 .044
Number 
Grades -9.136 2.668 -.250 -3.425 .002
Does Not Rank 6.442 2.502 .209 2.575 .015
# of 1L classes 1.440 .717 .154 2.008 .054
1
School has A+ 
grades 2.446 2.292 .082 1.067 .294
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U.S. News Academic Reputation School Name National Employment Placement School Name
1 Harvard 1 Chicago
1 Stanford 2 Harvard
1 Yale 3 Columbia
4 Chicago 4 NYU
4 Columbia 5 Virginia
6 Michigan 6 Michigan
6 NYU 7 Northwestern
8 UC Berkeley 8 Yale
9 Virginia 9 Penn
10 Penn 10 Stanford
11 Cornell 11 UC Berkeley
11 Duke 12 Vanderbilt
11 Northwestern 13 Duke
14 Georgetown 14 Cornell
15 Texas 15 Georgetown
If a school’s academic reputation was the sole determinant of a school’s national 
employment placement, one would expect the national employment placement rankings to mirror 
the academic reputation rankings.  While there are strong similarities – 14 schools appear on 
both lists – there are some readily apparent differences.  Most notably, two of the schools tied for 
first place in the academic reputation rankings, Yale and Stanford, are located in the lower half 
of the top ten in the national employment rankings.  Even if one were to argue that the U.S. News 
academic reputation rankings fail to perfectly measure a school’s academic reputation, other 
studies examining reputation and faculty quality, such as the rankings compiled by Leiter, have 
Yale and Stanford ranked at or near the top.58
I do not doubt that Yale and Stanford are among the most prestigious law schools in the 
United States, and am not claiming that, all else equal, employers would prefer to hire Michigan 
or Northwestern graduates over Yale and Stanford graduates.  However, all is not equal among 
these schools, and the differences among these schools are not necessarily due to differences in 
the student body.  In fact, the differences between schools like Yale and Stanford and schools 
like Michigan and Northwestern are due to institutional differences that individual students 
simply cannot control.  Yale, Stanford, Michigan, Northwestern, and the other schools I have 
examined differ in their grading and rank disclosure policies, as well as the number of courses 
they require students to complete during the first year of law school.  Law students cannot 
separate themselves from their institution’s characteristics.  A Yale student cannot have letter 
grades appear on her transcript rather than honors/pass/fail grades, and a Georgetown student 
cannot have any class rank information released to any students or employers when Georgetown 
freely discloses rank cutoffs.  A Penn student cannot choose between taking eight, ten, or twelve 
classes during his or her first year of law school.  Therefore, under no circumstances could a 
Yale student and a Northwestern student ever be completely equal.  Simply because these 
students attend institutions with differing policies, there will always be differences between them 
unless one institution changes its policies to completely mirror those of the other.
58
 Leiter ranks Yale and Stanford #1 and #4 respectively in faculty quality.  See Brian Leiter, Educational Quality 
Rankings of U.S. Law Schools (2003), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/rankings03.html.
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In the following subsections, I will examine the institutional policies that are so 
significant that they can either cause a school’s national employment placement to improve or 
worsen relative to its reputation.
A. Grading Systems
Very few, if any, individuals would argue that employers, particularly prestigious law 
firms, do not care about grades.  In her article Evaluation in Hiring, Heather S. Woodson, the 
chair of Stinson, Mag & Fizzell’s recruiting committee, concisely summarizes the importance of 
grades in the hiring process:
No matter how much law students wish it was not true, law firms do care about grades and class rank. 
Every lawyer I interviewed in connection with this article mentioned academic achievement as one of the 
primary criteria used in evaluating law students. One lawyer described academic record as the “door 
opener”. Without a good academic record, the student may never get a chance to persuade a firm to 
interview him or her. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is very difficult in an interview, 
whether it is 20 minutes or a full day, to evaluate the student's intellectual and analytical ability. High 
academic achievement is at least an indication that a student “has the bullets” necessary to do well at a law 
firm.59
However, ABA-accredited law schools use several different grading systems, and have differing 
class rank disclosure policies; top schools in particular seem hesitant to reveal class rank 
information.  An employer cannot simply put a Chicago transcript side by side with a NYU or 
Yale transcript and determine which individual has a higher class standing.  After all, how would 
one go about comparing a 178 from Chicago with a 3.42 from NYU with one H and three HPs 
from Yale?  
Of course, if employers are willing to put a lot of effort into extensively researching these 
differing systems, they might be able to come up with a way of comparing these applicants with 
each other.  Woodson, however, states that “Grading systems vary widely among law schools, 
and most practicing lawyers do not want to spend a lot of time trying to interpret and distinguish 
these differences.”60  If employers are unwilling or unable to properly distinguish differing 
grading systems, some schools may have greater success at placing their students, relative to 
their peer schools, if they implement a grading system that employers find more favorable.  My 
research supports this hypothesis.
Although each individual school’s grading system has its own intricacies, previous 
researchers have been able to classify every school’s grading system into one of three groups: a 
traditional letter grade system, a numbers system, and an honors/pass/fail system (often called a 
“no grades” system).61  The unique characteristics of each system are apparent from their names.  
59
 Heather S. Woodson, Evaluation in Hiring, 65 UMKC L. REV. 931 at 932 (1997).
60 Id. 
61 See Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415, 416 (1994); Jay M. 
Feinman, Law School Grading, 65 UMKC L. REV. 647, 650.  Kaufman identified three types of grading systems –
letter grade, numbers grade, and “other.”  The “other” systems included schools that used the honors/pass/fail 
system, like Yale, as well as schools that used a hybrid numbers/letters system, like Stanford.  Feinman identified 
two types of systems: ordinal systems and interval systems.  Schools with ordinal systems had the honors/pass/fail 
system, while schools with interval systems had either a letter system or a numbers system.  I chose to use the letter, 
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The traditional letter grade system awards letter grades such as A-, B+, C, and F, to students.  
The numbers system, rather than (or in addition to) using letters, awards numbers as grades.  The 
no grades system, in contrast, either uses pure pass/fail grading or uses pass/fail grading in 
conjunction with an “honors” distinction.  As a general rule, the no grades system has very few 
gradations available, while the numbers system has many gradations available.  In other words, 
relative to the letter grade system, the no grades system minimizes differentiation among 
students while the numbers system maximizes differentiation.
Supporters of both the numbers and the no grades systems have argued that these 
alternative systems are more beneficial to their students than traditional letter grade systems.  
Those who support the numbers system argue that transcripts that show great differentiation 
among students provide immense benefits to the top of the class.  For instance, Chicago’s strong 
clerkship placement is often credited to its numbers grading system, as it allows for very fine 
differentiation even at the top of the class.  Similarly, those who support honors/pass/fail systems 
argue that those in the lower half of the class are benefited since it is extremely difficult for 
employers to differentiate among them.62
Both of these claims are probably true, to some degree – the numbers system likely 
benefits those at the top of the class, and the no grades system benefits those at the bottom of the 
class.  However, the benefits these systems confer to those at the extremes do not come without 
any costs.  Although these nontraditional systems may significantly help those at the top and 
those at the bottom, they bring about substantial costs to the middle of the class – a significantly 
larger group – and thus result in a net negative effect on national employment placement relative 
to the traditional letter system.
Letter Grade Systems
Under a traditional letter grade system, there is relatively little differentiation in the 
nebulous middle.  Law school curves are often designed to generate outliers, and thus it is 
difficult to differentiate between people in the “nebulous middle” since at many top schools 30-
35% of the class gets a B+ and another 30-35% gets a B.  Employers can easily distinguish true 
differences in ability among the 25-30% of the class that consistently gets either As/A-s or 
Bs/Cs.  However, the differences in the rest of the class are not as apparent because of the curve 
structure, and interviewers – often first year associates who have only recently finished law 
school themselves – know that the difference between a B+ and a B might not amount to much.  
This sort of system, meaning one that generates outliers at the extremes but leaves an 
undifferentiated middle, might not benefit those in the very top of the class, who could one day 
apply for Supreme Court clerkships, or those at the very bottom, whose failings are obvious, but 
it seems to strongly benefit the class as a whole, since most of the class ends up in the middle.
number, and honors/pass/fail categorizations because each of these systems is truly unique and it is inappropriate to 
merge honors/pass/fail systems with some numbers systems, as Kaufman did, or to merge letter systems with 
numbers systems as Feinman did.  Although it is true that some schools, like Stanford, have what appear to be 
hybrid systems, in reality these systems bear far more resemblance to a numbers system, in that they offer 
significantly more gradations than a letter system, and the number grade appears on the transcript even if a letter 
grade is also present.
62 See generally http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=114393&mc=23&forum_id=2 (discussing 
whether a no grades system results in better employment prospects for the bottom half of the class).
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Numbers Systems
The numbers system, by creating a pure bell curve that eliminates ambiguity, allows too 
much differentiation, to the point where it reduces opportunities for those in the lower end of the 
middle, whose credentials would look more impressive if employers did not know that they 
barely got their B+s, or who just narrowly avoided getting a B- instead of a B.  A numbers 
system may also make the bottom of the class look worse than under a letter system, for under a 
letter system the B- (or C) grade provides an artificial floor for those who did very poorly in a 
class but did not engage in any academic misconduct that would justify a discretionary F.  
However, under a numbers system, where the difference between the median grade and the 
lowest possible non-failing grade can be very large, employers can see just how poorly an 
individual did in a given class, which could do more damage to an individual’s job prospects 
than a B- or two.
Honors/Pass/Fail (No Grades) Grading Systems
While those at the bottom of Yale or Berkeley’s class might benefit from their 
nontraditional honors/pass/fail systems, those in the nebulous middle may have their job 
prospects impaired because employers cannot distinguish them from the bottom of the class.  
Those who favor these systems argue that creating very little differentiation helps most students 
because employers traditionally attach too much weight to grades, and having what amounts to a 
binary honors/pass grading system (since failures are extremely rare) makes it impossible for an 
employer to use grades to differentiate most of the class.
Theoretically, employers are supposed to respond by placing very little weight on grades 
at schools that use this system, and place greater weight on other factors, such as institutional 
prestige or interviewing skills.  Those who favor other systems63 have pointed out the obvious 
flaw with this argument: very few, if any, employers recruit exclusively at Yale – the typical law 
firm might recruit at as many as 25 or 30 law schools.  Yale students are not competing just with 
other Yale students; they are also competing with Harvard students, Columbia students, Penn 
students, Georgetown students, and a slew of others at the most prestigious schools.  While Yale 
might be more prestigious than Columbia, very few people believe that the reputation gap 
between them is very large, to the point where most employers would prefer hiring from the very 
bottom of Yale’s class over the top (or even middle) of Columbia’s class.
My findings provide strong support for this counterargument.  Although there certainly 
are some lower ranked law firms that do not care about grades and will hire a Yale student 
simply because he or she attends Yale, those firms would hire Yale students regardless of 
whether Yale had a traditional grading system or an honors/pass/fail system.  However, higher 
ranked firms, which are more selective and place a high value on grades, are unlikely to change 
their hiring practices – and, when faced with hiring a Columbia student who they are almost 
certain is in the middle of his or her class or a Yale student who could be in the middle of the 
class but could just as plausibly be in the bottom 20%, many firms would rather hire the 
Columbia student.  This is not because these firms feel Columbia is more prestigious than Yale, 
but because law firms, as businesses, are risk averse in hiring and would rather hire an individual 
63 See generally Daniel Keating, Ten Myths About Law School Grading, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 171 (1998).
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they know excelled at a slightly less prestigious school over someone about whom they have 
little meaningful information about from a slightly more prestigious school.  In other words, 
Yale’s system, by only creating outliers at the top and then having a “nebulous bottom 70%,” 
likely causes individuals from the middle of Yale’s class to go to lower ranked firms than they 
would otherwise, and thus brings about a net negative effect on employment placement.
There is an additional reason to believe that schools with no grades systems impair the 
average student’s employment prospects.  Scholars have theorized that law school grades serve 
as a motivating factor: by having grades, students are motivated to learn more than they would 
otherwise.64 Empirical research suggests that students who take courses on a pass/fail basis are 
significantly less likely to perform well in those courses  relative to students taking the courses on 
a letter grade basis.65 Richard Lempert, in his article Law School Grading: An Experiment with 
Pass-Fail, discusses the results of an experiment he conducted at the University of Michigan 
Law School in 1970.  In this experiment, second and third year students were allowed to take one 
course per semester on a pass/fail basis, although not everyone who requested that a course be 
taken pass/fail would ultimately have that option. Half the students who requested to take a 
course pass/fail were randomly selected to receive a letter grade, while the other half took the 
course on a pass/fail basis.  During the fifth week of the semester, all participating students were 
informed whether they were getting a letter grade or a pass/fail grade.  Lempert, in order to 
determine what impact pass/fail grading had on course performance, examined the cumulative 
GPAs of all participating students.  There was no significant difference in the mean cumulative 
GPA between students who took all their courses for letter grades and those who took a class 
pass/fail.  However, there was a highly significant difference in the grades the two groups earned 
in the courses taken for pass/fail credit.  In those courses, the group enrolled for a letter grade 
achieved a mean course grade of 3.06, while the group enrolled on a pass/fail basis attained a 
mean course grade of 2.65.66  Lempert wrote that “[t]he results of this experiment suggest that if 
a ‘wildcard’ type pass-fail system such as the one used in this experiment were to be generally 
adopted, student performance in pass-fail courses as measured by examination grades would fall 
off noticeably.”67
Unfortunately, no researcher has followed up on Lembert’s study to examine the impact 
of taking all courses on a pass/fail basis rather than just one per semester.  However, given the 
significant gap in achievement between the two groups in his study, it is not hard to imagine that 
Yale students taking their first year courses on a pass/fail basis are earning significantly lower 
examination grades on their exams than they would under a letter grade system.  Although there 
has been considerable debate, both among legal academics and students, about the meaning of 
law school grades, only an extreme fringe (if anyone at all) would argue that there is absolutely 
no relationship at all between examination grades and knowledge of course material.  Yale Law 
alumni, particularly very recent graduates, have often been criticized for being too academic and 
lacking some of the practical skills possessed by Harvard and Columbia graduates.  While some 
of these comments may be in jest, there likely is an underlying truth to such comments, which 
64 Steve H. Nickles, Examining and Grading in American Law Schools, 30 ARK. L. REV. 411, 427 (1977)
65 Richard Lempert, Law School Grading: An Experiment with Pass-Fail, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1972).
66 Id. at 267.
67 Id. at 284.
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then translates into employers preferring to hire students from comparable schools.68  It is likely 
that the average Columbia student retains more knowledge from substantive courses, such as 
torts or contracts, than the average Yale student, simply because all Columbia students are 
graded on those subjects and will presumably put significantly more effort into their studies than 
Yale students, who are being graded pass/fail and would likely only do the minimum amount of 
preparation needed to achieve a passing grade.  Yale students, therefore, might require a greater 
amount of training from employers on average than their counterparts from other schools, and 
thus employers may prefer to hire from other schools in order to avoid taking on this additional 
burden.69
 B. Number of First Year Law School Classes
The number of classes taken during the first year of law school can lessen the negative 
aspects of both nontraditional systems.  Even if the honors/pass/fail system makes it very hard to 
differentiate the middle of the class from the bottom of the class, the more classes an individual 
takes under this system, the easier it will be for certain trends to emerge that could make more 
differentiation possible.  If students take twelve classes, the number of individuals who are 
unable to get even one honors grade will naturally be smaller than if students only took five or 
six classes – thus, employers could more easily identify individuals at the very bottom of the 
class, and distinguish them from individuals who are truly in the middle.  
While employers may still have difficulty comparing a Yale applicant to a Columbia 
applicant, the Yale applicant will benefit from having more classes (and more honors grades) on 
his or her transcript, since even if the employer assumes the worst possible scenario with the 
Yale applicant’s grades, the worst possible scenario is better with twelve classes than it is with 
only six classes.  The same is true of the numbers system, but in the opposite direction: more 
classes add slightly greater ambiguity, since it allows individuals who might have done poorly in 
their first term to visibly improve their performance, and thus make it easier to persuade an 
employer that a very low number grade was an aberration.  In addition, those at the top of the 
class look even better when more classes are required, since sustaining a very high average over 
the course of twelve classes is harder than over the course of eight classes.
Employers may prefer individuals who attend schools that require many first year courses 
for another reason.  In his research, Gary Negin examined the impact test frequency in a first 
year torts class had on final examination grade.70  Negin divided participating students into three 
groups of 25 students each.  Over the course of the term, the first group was given four exams, 
68 See generally Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The Market for Elite Firm Associates, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
909, 925 (2004).  Many of the elite Chicago law firm hiring partners the authors interviewed stated that it was not 
worthwhile to interview at Yale due to the school’s heavy academic focus.  The authors speculate that many of these 
firms recruit at Yale in order to signal quality to future clients and competitors, and not because they intend to 
actually hire any students.
69
 Alternatively, one might argue self selection: students who enroll in schools that use honors/pass/fail systems 
might not care as much about firm prestige and might not be as competitive as students who attend schools that use 
letter or number systems.  However, I do not find this argument persuasive, for nothing in the previous literature 
would suggest that students at Yale are less competitive or less ambitious than students at Harvard, or students at 
Northeastern less competitive or less ambitious than students at Suffolk.
70 Gary A. Negin, The Effects of Test Frequency in a First-Year Torts Course, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 673, 674 (1981).
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the second group was given two exams, and the third group only received one final exam.71
Negin’s experiment resulted in highly significant results: the 50 students who had taken multiple 
exams received, on average, significantly higher grades on the final exam than students who had
only take a final exam.72
Although Negin focused on raw grade differentiation in only one class, it is likely that a 
similar effect might take place at schools that require more first year law classes – particularly at 
schools like Chicago that run on the quarter system, and may break down traditional one term 
first year courses into two quarter courses.  Students at Chicago, by taking many courses that test 
the same subject matter, may be performing at higher levels in those subject areas than students 
at comparable schools that have fewer courses and exams.  In other words, Chicago students who 
have earned the median course grade in contracts might have greater knowledge of contracts than 
Columbia students who earned the median course grade in contracts.  This difference in 
knowledge may well manifest itself on the job, thus giving employers reason to prefer Chicago 
graduates.  Of course, this is based on my own speculation based on my findings and the results 
of Negin’s experiment.  In order to confirm or deny this hypothesis, one would have to conduct 
an experiment similar to Negin’s that focuses primarily on this issue.
C. Class Rank Disclosure
My results suggest that the best system overall system uses letter grades but does not 
disclose class rank or class rank cutoffs to students or employers.  Under this system, employers 
may identify individuals at the very top and very bottom of the class, but cannot with any real 
accuracy distinguish the nebulous middle since they will not know the exact GPA cutoffs for the 
top 33% or top 50%.  Although those at the extreme top may not do as well as under a numbers 
system and those at the extreme bottom may not do as well as under an honors/pass/fail system, 
the class as a whole is better off because the overwhelming majority of the class ends up in the 
nebulous middle.
Some might speculate that class rank disclosure should not matter at all.  After all, if class 
rank was not disclosed, wouldn’t employers respond by attempting to calculate rank themselves?  
This is a legitimate point, and I concede that there is nothing to stop an employer from engaging 
in such an activity.  However, in his article Who’s “Number One”?: Contriving 
Unidimensionality in Law School Grading,  Jeffrey Evans Stake makes a persuasive argument as 
to why not calculating a formal GPA or providing class rank information can benefit students 
even if employers create their own unofficial averages:
At the very minimum, we could stop publishing grade point averages and class ranks. Employers can, of 
course, calculate averages on their own. But in the process of doing so they may realize that the average of 
an A in Appellate Advocacy and a B- in Property simply does not mean much. Employers may also, in 
studying the particular grades, pay some attention to the courses and try to determine whether likely job 
performance is indicated in some of the grades more than others. Furthermore, over time, employers might 
begin to see patterns in the predictive quality of the data--for example, tax grades might predict 
71 Id. at 675.
72 Id. at 676.
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performance as a tax planner, but not as a litigator. Employers could, in other words, get more information 
out of the data they already receive if they were made to take a longer look.73
While Stakes makes a good point, his theory alone may not explain why a school’s 
failure to disclose class rank information benefits its students.  Yet rather than examining the 
effect the lack of class rank disclosure on an employer’s perception, one might want to consider 
the impact disclosing class rank has on students.  The field of psychology may provide an answer 
to this question.
Dr. Andrew Watson, in his landmark study on the psychology of legal education, 
identified several negative ways in which class ranking disclosure impact law students.  
According to Watson, “law school education explicitly shapes the character development of law 
students in certain ways which are detrimental to efficient professional performance.”74 Students 
who discover that they were ranked in the bottom of the class interpret their ranking as a symbol 
that they have “failed,”75 and as a result become both cynical and unemotional,76 and their people 
skills become impaired.77  Other scholars have reported similar behavior among law students.  
Kissam observed that “many disappointed members of the journeyman and loser classes develop 
attitudes of hostility, isolation, emotional detachment, and malaise.”78  Himmelstein found that 
law students with low class ranks will often doubt their ability to be successful practitioners, and 
will suffer from lower self-confidence and self-awareness.79
Surprisingly, researchers have not specifically examined the psychological effects of 
class ranking disclosure on law students going through the law firm employment process.  
However, it is not difficult to speculate on the impact these negative traits may have on student 
behavior.  Students who know their exact or approximate class rank might be more risk averse in 
on campus interviewing due to their greater cynicism, lower self-confidence, and greater 
identification with their rank.  For instance, if a law firm lists top 50% rank as a requirement, 
individuals who just barely missed out on being in the top 50% may not bid to interview with 
that firm, believing that they would not get the job; similarly, individuals who know they are in 
the top 33% but not in the top 25% may avoid interviewing with firms who have a top 25% 
cutoff.  In contrast, students who go to schools where absolutely no class rank information is 
disclosed to anyone may cast a broader net, since individuals who in reality are in the top 33% 
but not top 25% may think they are in the top 25%, and individuals who are really only in the top 
55% may think they are in the top 50%.  While firms often do list rank cutoffs, it is common for 
firms to not rigidly adhere to them and to allow for factors such as personality compensate for a 
lower than desired rank.80  Additionally, if the people skills of law students who are aware of 
73
 Jeffrey Evans Stake, Who’s “Number One”?:  Contriving Unidimensionality in Law School Grading, 68 IND. L.J.
925, 928-29 (1993).
74 Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 91, 131 (1968).
75 Id. at 119, 130.
76 Id. at 131.
77 Id. at 133.
78 Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 433, 481 (1989).
79 Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Application of Humanistic Educational 
Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 590-91(1978).
80
 Woodson, supra note 59, at 933.
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their low rank are impaired, as Watson observed, they may not interview as well compared to 
students at schools who do not rank.  
V. Where Do We Go From Here?
Some individuals are very open about their desire for law students to make enrollment 
decisions completely subjectively.  U.S. News, for instance, printed the following statement from 
admissions counselor Loretta DeLoggio in its law school guide: “I think anyone who applies to 
both Cornell and NYU hasn’t got a clue what they’re doing.”81  Never mind that both schools are 
clearly wonderful choices if you want a very high chance of earning a $125,000 salary after 
graduation, and that such schools are so hard to get into that only a fool would not apply to 
multiple top schools – DeLoggio seems to think that subjective factors such as “fit” should take 
priority over financial considerations.  It is unethical to force all prospective students to make 
this sort of subjective decision by not providing the standardized data necessary to make an 
objective decision.  While I agree that prospective students should consider geographic location, 
culture, diversity, and a host of other factors, these students should have the choice to weigh 
objective factors such as employment placement along with these subjective factors, and make 
the appropriate tradeoffs at their own discretion.
I have developed the first set of national and regional employment rankings that properly 
account for student geographical and sectoral preferences as well as differing class sizes, and 
have identified several highly significant variables that are strong predictors of national 
employment placement, yet more can still be done.  As stated earlier, the information used to 
generate these rankings is not quite perfect; because law schools have released such limited 
employment data, I had to rely on law firm websites to obtain information on the 15,293 
associates included in my dataset.  This is a very good measure of placement, though granted it is 
not flawless.
An ideal world where employment data for every law school, broken down by all student 
demographics, is publicly available for use by any researcher who wishes to examine it will 
never happen, both due to the heavy costs involved as well as anonymity concerns.  However, 
perfect data is not necessary.  If law schools were to publicly release any sort of standardized 
employment data, prospective law students would not need to look at external sources, such as 
this study, to determine whether attending a given law school is the best choice for them.  As 
discussed earlier in this paper, median salaries and percentage of students employed at 
graduation is not sufficient, since both measures are flawed and do not allow for true 
differentiation among law schools.
For most people, law school will be one of the biggest investments of their lives.  When 
deciding where to obtain their legal education, prospective students should have access to basic 
employment information – which employers recruit on campus, how many students request 
interviews with them, how many students ultimately interview with each employer, how many 
callbacks were given to students who interviewed, how many students accepted those callbacks, 
how many students received offers, how many students accepted offers, and what percentage of 
81
 Loretta DeLoggio, Quoted in U.S. News & World Report (2004), available at 
http://www.deloggio.com/homepage/satisfid/quoted.htm.  
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the entire class received at least one offer from an employer that participates in on campus 
recruiting.  This should be the bare minimum information provided – ideally, schools would also 
include information about each employer, such as starting salary.
Although some law schools, such as Harvard, already provide this information to their 
current students, all law schools should publicly provide this information on their websites, or 
provide a link to a centralized website that would list this information for every accredited law 
school.  Naturally, schools that do a poor job of placing their students will not want to release 
this data, let alone publicize it.  To avoid this problem, I strongly urge the AALS and the ABA to 
use their power to pressure or require law schools to provide this information to prospective 
students, just as they provide student attrition and bar exam passage rates.  Not only would this 
decrease reliance on unscientific and unreliable ranking schemes, such as U.S. News, it would 
give deficient law schools an incentive to redirect their resources towards improving 
employment placement.
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Appendix A.  Regional TQS Rankings
Region 1: New England – CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 1 TQS School Name Region 1 TQS
Columbia 100.00 Average School 50.00
Virginia 92.16 Fordham 49.90
NYU 87.81 Notre Dame 31.08
Penn 86.80 Connecticut 28.36
Harvard 74.95 Syracuse 24.52
Duke 73.13 Western New England 16.85
Georgetown 70.97 Pace 15.73
Michigan 66.77 Franklin Pierce 13.53
Yale 62.02 Vermont 13.50
Chicago 61.91 Suffolk 13.37
Boston College 59.15 Quinnipiac 6.16
Cornell 57.59 Roger Williams 0.61
Boston University 53.82 Maine 0.00
George Washington 52.18 Denver 0.00
Northeastern 51.88 New England Law 0.00
Region 2: Mid Atlantic – NJ, NY, PA (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 2 TQS School Name Region 2 TQS
Chicago 100.00 Cardozo 42.19
Northwestern 99.29 Miami 39.26
Harvard 95.34 Connecticut 37.91
Virginia 90.96 Wisconsin 34.94
NYU 90.89 Iowa 33.04
Columbia 89.23 Vermont 31.78
UNC 88.64 St Johns 31.23
Yale 85.94 Washington & Lee 29.15
Michigan 84.11 Northeastern 26.88
Cornell 80.23 Brooklyn 25.76
Penn 80.01 Franklin Pierce 25.04
Stanford 79.89 Catholic 24.07
UC Berkeley 79.53 Temple 23.25
Texas 77.68 Villanova 22.43
Emory 75.18 Pace 21.43
UCLA 73.77 Suffolk 16.84
UC Hastings 69.49 Pitt 16.83
Boston University 68.51 New York Law School 15.85
Boston College 68.45 Hofstra 15.26
Vanderbilt 67.46 Syracuse 15.08
Howard 67.14 UIUC 13.59
Duke 66.96 Quinnipiac 10.68
WUSTL 65.76 SUNY Buffalo 9.97
Notre Dame 62.08 Penn State 9.93
George Washington 61.60 Seton Hall 9.67
Georgetown 59.95 Albany 7.92
Case Western 56.76 Touro 4.25
American 56.70 Cooley 4.15
Fordham 54.04 Western New England 4.12
William & Mary 51.32 Widener 3.24
AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00 CUNY 0.00
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Tulane 48.84 New England Law School 0.00
Region 3: Midwest – IL, IN, MI, OH, WI (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 3 TQS School Name Region 3 TQS
NYU 100.00 Case Western 48.47
Penn 97.64 Ohio State 45.46
Vanderbilt 93.85 DePaul 35.59
Chicago 93.20 Syracuse 33.21
Harvard 92.06 Chicago-Kent 28.61
Virginia 84.30 Cincinnati 18.61
Michigan 79.89 John Marshall 18.59
Columbia 79.38 Cleveland State 14.20
Duke 76.43 Indiana – Indianapolis 13.42
Northwestern 75.88 Capital 10.38
Stanford 73.65 Marquette 10.36
Georgetown 68.05 Toledo 8.66
Yale 67.95 Valparaiso 8.21
Minnesota 67.41 Wayne State 7.96
Texas 66.34 Akron 7.77
George Washington 65.12 Northern Illinois 7.18
Iowa 64.77 Michigan State 5.04
Boston College 62.79 Detroit 4.66
UIUC 60.98 Ohio Northern 4.12
Notre Dame 60.01 Dayton 3.87
WUSTL 59.42 Saint Louis 3.24
Tulane 58.63 Southern Illinois 1.70
Indiana – Bloomington 52.21 Louisville 0.00
Wisconsin 51.06 Northern Kentucky 0.00
Loyola Chicago 50.54 Cooley 0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00
Region 4: West North Central – IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 4 TQS School Name Region 4 TQS
Michigan 100.00 George Washington 37.34
Wisconsin 90.86 Washburn 29.91
Notre Dame 79.90 Saint Louis 26.79
UIUC 60.10 William Mitchell 25.84
Minnesota 59.75 Creighton 24.68
Tulsa 58.57 Hamline 17.99
Harvard 56.36 Missouri – Columbia 16.40
Iowa 56.07 Nebraska 16.40
WUSTL 54.97 Southern Illinois 16.14
Georgetown 50.03 Drake 14.29
AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00 South Dakota 11.50
Missouri – Kansas City 45.94 North Dakota 10.71
Kansas 43.99
Region 5: South Atlantic – DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 5 PCP School Name Region 5 PCP
Chicago 100.00 U of Georgia 30.88
UC Berkeley 93.30 Minnesota 29.33
Harvard 89.33 Iowa 29.03
Columbia 88.72 U of Florida 28.13
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Yale 83.86 Wake Forest 28.08
Cornell 77.34 New York Law School 27.63
Vanderbilt 75.95 Villanova 27.12
Stanford 75.03 Memphis 22.83
Duke 74.41 Brooklyn 21.42
Northwestern 74.31 Georgia State 20.74
Michigan 71.29 Toledo 20.74
Georgetown 71.01 Miami 20.35
NYU 70.08 John Marshall 20.09
Virginia 69.36 South Carolina 19.90
Notre Dame 65.39 Florida State 19.44
Penn 63.27 Mercer 16.80
Boston University 63.12 SUNY Buffalo 16.45
Boston College 59.61 Michigan State 15.57
Syracuse 57.91 Mississippi 14.25
George Washington 57.31 Richmond 14.14
Case Western 55.68 Suffolk 13.94
Franklin Pierce 55.56 UC Hastings 13.57
Brigham Young 54.52 Vermont 12.88
Emory 53.79 Temple 12.79
American 53.45 Northeastern 11.38
UIUC 53.13 Widener 11.29
Washington & Lee 52.65 Tulsa 11.23
Texas 52.46 Baltimore 10.17
Kentucky 51.35 Penn State 9.55
WUSTL 50.44 DePaul 8.42
William & Mary 50.39 Nova Southeastern 6.57
AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00 Dayton 6.00
Ohio State 49.67 Oklahoma 5.74
Alabama 48.37 St. Thomas 3.89
U of Washington 45.46 Stetson 3.81
Tulane 45.08 Loyola New Orleans 3.47
Catholic 44.79 Samford 2.89
Tennessee 42.98 North Carolina Central 2.59
Howard 40.86 West Virginia 2.22
George Mason 40.67 Cooley 1.96
Denver 40.50 Florida Coastal 1.22
Kansas 39.65 Campbell 0.00
Saint Louis 39.06 Regent 0.00
UNC 36.49 Appalachian 0.00
Maryland 35.20 Albany 0.00
Oregon 34.66 Valparaiso 0.00
Wisconsin 32.81 Ohio Northern 0.00
Pitt 31.35
Region 6: East South Central – AL, KY, MS, TN (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 6 TQS School Name Region 6 TQS
Emory 100.00 Alabama 5.81
Vanderbilt 62.74 Samford 5.81
Cincinnati 55.24 Mississippi College 0.00
Loyola New Orleans 52.99 Louisville 0.00
Virginia 51.10 Northern Kentucky 0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00 Washington & Lee 0.00
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Tennessee 37.02 Kentucky 0.00
Mississippi 28.29 Appalachian 0.00
Region 7: West South Central – AR, LA, OK, TX (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 7 TQS School Name Region 7 TQS
Harvard 100.00 AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00
Virginia 96.76 Tulane 47.07
Michigan 86.82 Baylor 44.56
Vanderbilt 86.73 Texas Tech 24.46
Chicago 86.37 South Texas 12.96
Georgetown 78.71 Oklahoma 12.83
Notre Dame 75.66 St. Marys 12.68
NYU 72.66 Arkansas – Little Rock 10.29
Duke 72.44 Louisiana State 8.74
Stanford 69.98 Texas Southern 6.38
Texas 68.36 Tulsa 3.45
Washington & Lee 57.85 Loyola New Orleans 2.26
Houston 57.07 Oklahoma City 2.22
Southern Methodist 56.01 Texas Wesleyan 0.82
George Washington 52.39 Cooley 0.00
Region 8: Rocky Mountains – AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 8 TQS School Name Region 8 TQS
Michigan 100.00 Vermont 36.83
Harvard 87.04 Denver 35.08
Texas 82.64 Pacific 27.72
Arizona State 79.45 Tulsa 23.22
Georgetown 77.16 Gonzaga 20.60
Iowa 72.92 Oregon 13.55
Syracuse 63.25 Idaho 11.17
Utah 60.90 U of Nevada – Las Vegas 9.49
U of Arizona 56.51 Montana 5.68
UC Berkeley 56.04 New Mexico 3.25
Brigham Young 55.23 Wyoming 0.00
George Washington 52.66 Chapman 0.00
Colorado 50.87 California Western 0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00 Cooley 0.00
San Diego 44.88
Region 9: Pacific – AK, CA, HI, OR, WA (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 9 TQS School Name Region 9 TQS
Columbia 100.00 Pepperdine 32.60
Chicago 92.05 WUSTL 30.86
NYU 82.44 U of Arizona 29.07
Penn 81.69 U of Washington 26.04
Virginia 76.83 American 24.90
George Washington 75.79 San Francisco 24.33
Stanford 75.12 San Diego 22.21
Northwestern 74.82 Syracuse 21.42
Yale 74.80 Southwestern 21.16
Michigan 73.83 Denver 19.79
Harvard 72.00 Northeastern 16.68
Duke 71.80 Arizona State 15.85
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Georgetown 68.30 Iowa 14.90
Cornell 68.15 Oregon 9.61
Boston University 65.60 Chapman 8.62
UC Berkeley 65.50 Seattle 7.95
Boston College 65.29 California Western 5.37
Vanderbilt 63.53 Pacific 5.03
Texas 63.09 Lewis & Clark 3.86
UCLA 60.87 Golden Gate 3.71
USC 57.00 Willamette 3.01
Wisconsin 56.20 Thomas Jefferson 1.43
Notre Dame 53.96 Hawaii 0.00
UC Hastings 52.36 Western State 0.00
Brigham Young 50.63 Whittier 0.00
Minnesota 50.57 Western New England 0.00
UC Davis 50.39 Drake 0.00
AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00 Tulsa 0.00
Santa Clara 48.90 Idaho 0.00
Tulane 43.78 Cooley 0.00
Loyola Marymount 34.13
Appendix B.  National TQS Rankings
The National Rankings (r = 2, F = 50 minimum)
School Name National TQS School Name National TQS
Chicago 92.48 Brigham Young 51.20
Harvard 87.88 William & Mary 50.52
Columbia 85.20 AVERAGE SCHOOL 50.00
NYU 82.30 Ohio State 49.43
Virginia 81.70 American 48.95
Michigan 78.82 UC Hastings 48.79
Northwestern 78.43 Tulane 48.25
Yale 75.86 Minnesota 47.65
Penn 74.97 Cincinnati 46.60
Stanford 73.59 San Diego 45.45
UC Berkeley 71.87 U of Washington 45.17
Vanderbilt 71.52 Washington & Lee 43.83
Duke 70.31 Wisconsin 43.17
Cornell 69.27 UIUC 40.08
Georgetown 66.71 John Marshall 39.97
Texas 65.69 Catholic 39.30
Boston College 62.51 DePaul 39.27
Boston University 61.67 Iowa 36.38
George Washington 61.32 Villanova 35.87
Notre Dame 60.81 Brooklyn 35.71
UNC 59.78 Pitt 34.95
Emory 59.64 New York Law School 33.81
UCLA 59.58 Temple 32.99
Howard 53.64 Syracuse 32.79
WUSTL 53.37 Pace 31.72
Case Western 53.31 Suffolk 29.29
Fordham 51.33 Northeastern 28.64
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Appendix C.  Regional Per Capita Placement Rankings
Region 1: New England – CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 1 PCP School Name Region 1 PCP
Virginia 77% George Washington 21%
NYU 73% Notre Dame 17%
Columbia 65% Connecticut 12%
Penn 65% Syracuse 12%
Harvard 51% Western New England 7%
Georgetown 49% Pace 6%
Duke 48% Franklin Pierce 5%
Chicago 44% Vermont 5%
Michigan 40% Suffolk 5%
Yale 34% Quinnipiac 3%
Boston College 34% Roger Williams 0%
Cornell 32% Maine 0%
Boston University 25% Denver 0%
Northeastern 23% New England Law 0%
Fordham 22%
Region 2: Mid Atlantic – NJ, NY, PA (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 2 PCP School Name Region 2 PCP
UNC 82% Connecticut 26%
Northwestern 81% Miami 26%
Chicago 75% Washington & Lee 26%
Virginia 73% Vermont 25%
Harvard 69% Wisconsin 23%
NYU 68% Northeastern 21%
Columbia 65% Temple 21%
Penn 64% Iowa 20%
Michigan 63% St. Johns 20%
Cornell 62% Villanova 20%
Yale 60% Catholic 18%
Texas 59% Franklin Pierce 17%
UC Berkeley 59% Brooklyn 16%
Stanford 55% Pace 16%
UCLA 54% Pitt 16%
Boston College 52% Suffolk 14%
Boston University 51% Syracuse 12%
Vanderbilt 49% Hofstra 10%
Notre Dame 48% New York Law School 10%
Duke 48% Penn State 9%
WUSTL 47% Seton Hall 9%
UC Hastings 47% Quinnipiac 8%
Case Western 44% SUNY Buffalo 7%
Howard 44% UIUC 7%
George Washington 44% Western New England 6%
William & Mary 42% Albany 5%
American 41% Cooley 4%
Georgetown 40% Touro 3%
Emory 36% Widener 3%
Fordham 36% CUNY 0%
Tulane 31% New England Law School 0%
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Cardozo 27%
Region 3: Midwest – IL, IN, MI, OH, WI (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 3 PCP School Name Region 3 PCP
Vanderbilt 81% Loyola Chicago 18%
NYU 73% Ohio State 17%
Harvard 66% DePaul 12%
Penn 64% Syracuse 12%
Chicago 63% Chicago-Kent 10%
Virginia 62% Cincinnati 9%
Duke 58% Indiana – Indianapolis 8%
Michigan 56% John Marshall 7%
Northwestern 49% Capital 6%
Columbia 47% Cleveland State 6%
Georgetown 42% Marquette 5%
Stanford 42% Northern Illinois 4%
George Washington 41% Toledo 4%
Iowa 41% Wayne State 4%
Minnesota 40% Akron 3%
Notre Dame 40% Michigan State 3%
Boston College 39% Valparaiso 3%
Texas 37% Dayton 2%
Yale 33% Detroit 2%
WUSTL 32% Saint Louis 2%
UIUC 31% Ohio Northern 2%
Indiana – Bloomington 25% Southern Illinois 1%
Tulane 25% Louisville 0%
Wisconsin 21% Northern Kentucky 0%
Case Western 20% Cooley 0%
Region 4: West North Central – IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 4 PCP School Name Region 4 PCP
Michigan 48% Creigton 6%
Wisconsin 38% George Washington 5%
Notre Dame 34% Washburn 5%
UIUC 16% William Mitchell 4%
Minnesota 15% Saint Louis 4%
Tulsa 14% Nebraska 4%
Harvard 14% Southern Illinois 4%
Iowa 13% Hamline 3%
WUSTL 12% Missouri – Columbia 3%
Georgetown 8% Drake 2%
Missouri – Kansas City 7% North Dakota 2%
Kansas 7% South Dakota 1%
Region 5: South Atlantic – DC, FL, GA, NC, SC, VA (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 5 PCP School Name Region 5 PCP
Chicago 95% Pitt 15%
UC Berkeley 90% Oregon 14%
Columbia 80% Minnesota 13%
Harvard 80% Villanova 13%
Yale 71% Wisconsin 13%
Vanderbilt 70% Iowa 11%
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Northwestern 66% Georgia State 11%
Duke 64% New York Law School 11%
Cornell 60% Toledo 11%
Stanford 60% South Carolina 11%
Michigan 55% Florida State 11%
Virginia 55% Miami 10%
Georgetown 54% Brooklyn 9%
Notre Dame 52% Memphis 9%
NYU 50% John Marshall 9%
Boston University 44% Mercer 9%
Penn 39% Richmond 9%
Boston College 38% Mississippi 8%
Syracuse 38% Michigan State 7%
George Washington 35% SUNY Buffalo 7%
Franklin Pierce 33% Northeastern 6% 
Emory 33% Suffolk 6%
Case Western 30% Temple 6%
American 27% Vermont 6%
Washington & Lee 27% Widener 6% 
Brigham Young 26% UC Hastings 5% 
William & Mary 26% Baltimore 5% 
Texas 25% DePaul 4% 
Kentucky 25% Nova Southeastern 4%
UIUC 24% Oklahoma 4% 
Alabama 24% Penn State 4%
WUSTL 23% Tulsa 4%
Tulane 21% Dayton 3%
Tennessee 21% Stetson 3% 
Ohio State 20% St. Thomas 2% 
U of Washington 19% Samford 1% 
Catholic 19% Loyola New Orleans 1%
George Mason 19% West Virginia 1%
Denver 19% Cooley 1% 
Kansas 18% Florida Coastal 1%
Saint Louis 18% North Carolina Central 1% 
UNC 18% Albany 0%
Howard 16% Appalachian 0% 
Maryland 16% Campbell 0%
Wake Forest 16% Ohio Northern 0%
U of Georgia 16% Regent 0%
U of Florida 15% Valparaiso 0%
Region 6: East South Central – AL, KY, MS, TN (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 6 PCP School Name Region 6 PCP
Emory 15% Samford 0%
Vanderbilt 6% Mississippi College 0%
Cincinnati 4% Louisville 0%
Loyola New Orleans 4% Northern Kentucky 0%
Virginia 4% Washington & Lee 0%
Tennessee 2% Kentucky 0%
Mississippi 2% Appalachian 0%
Alabama 0%
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Region 7: West South Central – AR, LA, OK, TX (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 7 PCP School Name Region 7 PCP
Harvard 66% Baylor 14%
Virginia 66% Tulane 13%
Vanderbilt 66% Texas Tech 9%
Michigan 55% South Texas 5%
Chicago 55% Oklahoma 4%
Georgetown 45% St. Marys 4%
Duke 44% Arkansas – Little Rock 3%
Notre Dame 42% Louisiana State 3%
NYU 41% Texas Southern 2%
Texas 38% Loyola New Orleans 1%
Stanford 34% Tulsa 1%
Washington & Lee 27% Oklahoma City 1%
Houston 23% Texas Wesleyan 0%
Southern Methodist 23% Cooley 0%
George Washington 23%
Region 8: Rocky Mountains – AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 8 PCP School Name Region 8 PCP
Michigan 52% Utah 5% 
Harvard 28% Pacific 4% 
Texas 27% Tulsa 4% 
Iowa 27% Gonzaga 3%
Georgetown 24% Oregon 3%
Syracuse 20% Vermont 3% 
Brigham Young 12% Idaho 2% 
Arizona State 11% Montana 1% 
UC Berkeley 9% New Mexico 1%
Colorado 7% U of Nevada – Los Vegas 1% 
U of Arizona 5% California Western 0% 
Denver 5% Chapman 0% 
George Washington 5% Cooley 0%
San Diego 5% Wyoming 0%
Region 9: Pacific – AK, CA, HI, OR, WA (n = 20 minimum)
School Name Region 9 PCP School Name Region 9 PCP
Columbia 85% Pepperdine 14%
Chicago 75% WUSTL 14%
Penn 63% U of Washington 13%
NYU 62% San Francisco 11%
Virginia 61% Arizona State 10%
George Washington 60% American 9%
Stanford 57% Denver 9%
Michigan 55% San Diego 9%
Yale 55% Southwestern 9%
Northwestern 54% Syracuse 9%
Duke 49% Northeastern 9%
Harvard 49% U of Arizona 9%
Georgetown 47% Iowa 7%
Cornell 46% Oregon 5%
Boston College 44% Chapman 4%
UC Berkeley 42% Seattle 4%
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Boston University 42% California Western 2%
Vanderbilt 40% Lewis & Clark 2%
Texas 38% Pacific 2%
UCLA 36% Willamette 2%
USC 32% Golden Gate 1%
Wisconsin 32% Thomas Jefferson 1%
Notre Dame 28% Hawaii 0%
UC Hastings 25% Western State 0%
Brigham Young 24% Whittier 0%
Minnesota 22% Western New England 0%
UC Davis 22% Drake 0%
Santa Clara 20% Tulsa 0%
Tulane 17% Idaho 0%
Colorado 17% Cooley 0%
Loyola Marymount 14% Southern 0%
